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INTRODUCTION
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Boeing aircraft company worked to ad-
dress the rising cost of jet fuel by inventing lighter metal alloys for use in
aerospace materials.' Among its discoveries was a method of producing
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Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law, the Pennsylvania State University. This research
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Bouchard, and Aidan Hollis. Thanks also to the participants of the Canadian Intellectual Prop-
erty Academy Conference in November 2009, the Mid-Atlantic Academy of Legal Studies in
Business in March 2010 and the Academy of Legal Studies in Business in August 2010 for
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1. Boeing Co. v. United States, 86 Fed. Cl. 303, 307 (2009).
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aluminum-lithium alloys with high "fracture toughness,"' and in 1989,
Boeing received a patent for the process.' Five years later, another aero-
space company working as a National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) contractor, Lockheed Martin, was attempting to
solve a similar problem related to materials used in the space shuttle.
Lighter materials were necessary for future shuttle missions to transport
components of the International Space Station. Lockheed Martin inde-
pendently discovered the same method that Boeing had patented, and
Lockheed Martin used it to lighten the shuttle's external fuel tank. When
Boeing discovered the unauthorized use of its patented method, it sued
the U.S. government and won a judgment of patent infringement in
2006.' Because U.S. law does not allow patent injunctions against the
government,6 Boeing must settle for damages, which will likely be a rea-
sonable royalty.
Boeing's legal dispute with the U.S. government may seem uncon-
troversial-even mundane-but it is an example of one of the most
contentious legal mechanisms in international law: a patent compulsory
license, which is colloquially referred to as "breaking a patent."' True,
2. Id.
3. U.S. Patent No. 4,840,682 (filed Nov. 21, 1985).
4. Boeing, 86 Fed. Cl. at 308-09.
5. Boeing Co. v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 397 (2006).
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2006) (making "reasonable and entire compensation" avail-
able for use of patentee's invention by United States without license). Section 1498 is the
exclusive remedy for unauthorized use of a patent by the U.S. government. Zoltek Corp. v.
United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
7. The definition of patent breaking or compulsory licensing is somewhat flexible.
One could include only explicit ex ante compulsory licenses, or throw in infringement-like
after-the-fact compensation mechanisms as well as antitrust remedies. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C.
§ 115 (2006) (codifying procedures for obtaining an ex ante compulsory license for "making
and distributing phonorecords"); United States v. Besser Mfg. Co., 343 U.S. 444, 447 (1952)
(defining compulsory licensing as "a well-recognized remedy where patent abuses are proved
in antitrust actions" and noting one "is required for effective relief"). But the definition also
reasonably encompasses the Boeing example. This unauthorized government use of a pri-
vately-owned invention is often characterized as a compulsory license. See, e.g., Cynthia M.
Ho, Unveiling Competing Patent Perspectives, 46 Hous. L. REv. 1047, 1094 (2009) (describ-
ing compulsory licenses as including "'government use' of patents ... whereby use of
patented inventions by government contractors are subject only to remuneration, but never
injunctions"); Jerome H. Reichman & Catherine Hasenzahl, Non-Voluntary Licensing of Pat-
ented Inventions 10 U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev. (UNCTAD) and Int'l Ctr. for Trade &
Sustainable Dev. (ICTSD) Project on Intell. Prop. Rights & Sustainable Dev., Issue Paper No. 5,
2004), available at http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd-series/iprs/CS reichmanhasenzahl.pdf. In
fact, such U.S. licenses were known when the relevant international rules were negotiated and
specific language was added to address the practice. See UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK
ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 466, 468 (2005) [hereinafter UNCTAD-ICTSD RESOURCE
BOOK] (noting such U.S. compulsory licensing practices were "well known at the time of the
adoption" of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreement (TRIPS)
Article 31 and account "for much of its peculiar language").
462 [Vol. 32:461
Boeing's case does not involve humanitarian suffering or pit an interna-
tional conglomerate against a developing nation. It's just business. But
that is exactly the point. The Boeing case demonstrates that the patent
breaking mechanism can have relatively common applications, and its
imposition by the U.S. government is evidence that even developed, in-
tellectual property rights-centric nations are willing participants in the
system. Such a case requires a cogent legal structure to ensure the gov-
ernment does not inequitably diminish Boeing's established rights.
However, in most academic and political debates, contexts like those
encompassing the Boeing case are ignored. The analysis has primarily
focused on a few (albeit important) contexts, particularly access to medi-
cines.' The problem with this approach is that it has left us with a
broader international regime that is understudied, vague, unpredictable,
and not useful when it really counts. A more comprehensive assessment
is necessary to understand how the mechanism of patent breaking should
be applied efficiently across all of its possible non-remedial contexts.9
Significantly, such an assessment is very timely. There is growing
discussion of the use of compulsory licensing to address access problems
in emerging crises, such as climate change.'o Moreover, as a result of
current discontent over recent initiatives to streamline the patent break-
ing system," the members of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
8. For recent examples, see Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha
Round's Public Health Legacy: Strategies for the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medi-
cines Under the Amended TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 921 (2007); Robert C. Bird,
Developing Nations and the Compulsory License: Maximizing Access to Essential Medicines
While Minimizing Investment Side Effects, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 209 (2009); Daniel R. Ca-
hoy, Confronting Myths and Myopia on the Road from Doha, 42 GA. L. REv. 131 (2007); Ho,
supra note 7; F. M. Scherer & Jayashree Watal, Post-TRIPS Options for Access to Patented
Medicines in Developing Nations, 5 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 913 (2002); Alan 0. Sykes, TRIPS,
Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha "Solution," 3 CHi. J. INT'L L. 47, 58-
62 (2002).
9. Going forward, this Article excludes consideration of compulsory licenses as anti-
trust remedies, as such licenses stem from an entirely different legal theory (remediation for
illegal activity), and thus do not have the same market impact as the other forms. Cahoy, supra
note 8, at 169-72.
10. See, e.g., Robert Fair, Does Climate Change Justify Compulsory Licensing of Green
Technology?, 6 BYU INT'L L. & MGT. REv. 21 (2009); Matthew Rimmer, The Road to Co-
penhagen: Intellectual Property and Climate Change, 4 J. INTELL. PRop. L. & PRAc. 784
(2009); Frances Williams, Patents Spat Looms at Climate Change Meeting, FT.CoM, July 12,
2009.
11. Even World Trade Organization (WTO) Director-General Pascal Lamy remarked on
the "debate ... over whether the [Doha] solution really works, or whether it continues to
throw up obstacles." Pascal Lamy, Director-General, WTO, Address at the World Intellectual
Property Organization Conference on Intellectual Property and Public Policy Issues: Strength-
ening Multilateral Cooperation on IP and Public Health (July 14, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/2009/ip-gc-ge/presentationslamy.html).
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appear open to discussing how it might be revised.12 Determining how to
improve patent breaking in a comprehensive sense has never been more
important.
This Article departs from the narrow focus of the existing patent
compulsory licensing literature by considering the mechanism more
broadly, as a general intellectual property tool. This approach presents
unique challenges because compulsory licensing can encompass so
many different types of problems and actors, and general recommenda-
tions are difficult to conceive in the abstract. Indeed, one need only look
to the original negotiations underlying the current system to see how
hard it is to find consensus." To address the complexity, this Article em-
ploys a unique experiential approach, looking to real-world failures of
the system to frame the issues for reform. In particular, it considers three
recent stories: (1) the failure of "access to medicines" legislation to de-
liver on its promise, (2) the opportunistic or political patent breaking of
developed and middle-developed countries, and (3) the inability to se-
cure licensed goods in emergency contexts in the face of confusing rules.
This Article finds that each story provides an important lesson that can
be incorporated into international law to create a truly effective patent
breaking rule. The threads of these three lessons weave a coherent fabric
of compulsory license policy.
Part I of this Article recounts the three stories of policy failure. Part
H extrapolates the takeaway lessons from the stories that must be incor-
porated into any functional patent breaking system. Part III provides the
structure of a functional system that provides the best incentives to en-
courage innovation and respect for basic human rights. Importantly, the
Article neither discourages nor encourages the use of compulsory licens-
ing, but rather suggests that a more intelligent policy can benefit all
stakeholders.
I. THREE STORIES OF POLICY FAILURE
Hailed as a means of promoting public health, demonized as a bar-
rier to trade, and scrutinized as a loophole in intellectual property
12. Kaitlin Mara, Efficacy of TRIPS Public Health Amendment in Question at WTO,
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Mar. 1, 2010,4:51 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/2010/03/01/efficacy-
of-TRIPs-public-health-amendment-in-question-at-wto; Catherine Saez, Health Waiver IP
Enforcement Discussed at Lively WTO TRIPS Council Meeting, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (June
10, 2010, 5:48 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2010/06/10/health-waiver-ip-
enforcement-discussed-at-lively-wto-trips-council-meeting.
13. See UNCTAD-ICTSD RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 7, at 463-67 (describing vari-
ous drafts of TRIPS Article 31 and the differing positions of developed and developing
countries).
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regimes, the legal ability to break patents has garnered a significant
amount of interest. Imposing such a compulsory license allows the gov-
ernment to use the patented invention, or permit another party to do so,
without the authorization of the patentee. 14 In fact, the patent is not de-
stroyed-it is otherwise still enforceable-but what is "broken"'- is the
patentee's right to exclude all others.16
While many (if not most) countries have some means of relaxing pat-
ent enforcement when necessary," it is relatively rare for such measures to
be employed.'" Still, the academic and international policy communities
have focused a great deal of attention on compulsory licensing as a relief
valve." In part, this may be due to the fact that patents are often viewed as
tools of multinational corporations, and compulsory licensing can be
viewed as a way for disadvantaged persons to gain a foothold on economic
empowerment. 20 Additionally, in response to those who object to the appli-
cation of a strong property rights regime to information, patent breaking
14. Reichman & Hasenzahl, supra note 7, at 10.
15. The phrase "patent breaking" is often used for hyperbolic effect in order to place
compulsory licenses in a more negative light. This Article has no such intent. Rather, it simply
uses the "breaking" terminology as a convenient means of conveying the business commu-
nity's perception of the impact of the mechanism.
16. This right of exclusion is often referred to as the sine qua non of property. See Kai-
ser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) ("In this case, we hold that the 'right
to exclude,' so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls within
this category of interests that the Government cannot take without compensation.").
17. See Reichman & Hasenzahl, supra note 7, at I ("About one hundred countries rec-
ognised some form of non-voluntary licensing in their patent laws by the early 1990s.").
Examples of industrialized nations with compulsory licensing regimes include the United
Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and Japan. Joseph A. Yosick, Compulsory Licensing for Efficient
Use of Inventions, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 1275, 1289-90 (2001).
18. As noted earlier, compulsory licensing could be defined in many ways. See supra
note 7. But even using the broadest definition, the number of times in which compulsory li-
censing has been employed would certainly pale in comparison to instances of voluntary
licensing or infringement cases, so it can be fairly called rare. See Ho, supra note 7, at 1071.
However, with no international reporting mechanism, there is no way to know the actual
amount of global compulsory licensing.
19. See, e.g., supra note 8. Other examples include F. M. SCHERER, THE ECONOMIC
EFFECTS OF COMPULSORY PATENT LICENSES (1977); Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What
Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?,
18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853 (2003); Fair, supra note 10. Such relief valves are an essential
part of property systems in general. See generally Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-
Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009) (noting that
there are times when property rights should give way to a greater social good).
20. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of
TRIPS Implementation in India's Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1571, 1579-86
(2009) (describing, primarily in the context of India, the transition to stronger patent rights in
the developing world and strategies such as compulsory licensing used to counter it); Peter K.
Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 888 (2007) ("[Tlhere is no de-
nial that the TRIPS agreement is biased against developing countries.").
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may provide a welcome limitation.2 Despite these commendable inten-
tions, there is little to applaud in the policy realm; the actual
implementation of compulsory licensing for the public good has been
disappointing and its true potential is largely unrealized.
The following three stories help explain current international com-
pulsory licensing failures. One can see how the regime, as currently
designed, is unable to satisfy positive policy goals while at the same time
it remains open for exploitation.
A. The Access to Medicines Conundrum
At first glance, compulsory licensing seems like a natural component
of the ongoing effort to increase access to medicines. The covered arti-
cles are well defined and clearly important: pharmaceutical intervention
is a key weapon in the battle against diseases that disproportionately af-
fect the developing world, namely HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and
malaria.22 And because patents on pharmaceuticals can permit companies
to raise prices,23 it is logical to assume that access in poor nations might
be unduly restricted.2 Indeed, one can find evidence of significant price
differences in examples of branded and generic versions of identical
21. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Open Access, Law, Knowledge, Copyrights, Dominance and
Subordination, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 869, 872-74 (2006) ("Developed nations that
enforce patent rights ... are preventing people who are unwilling or unable to pay surcharges
from reaping the benefits of knowledge that in and of itself is freely available."); Joseph E.
Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 1693, 1699-
1700 (2008) ("[I]ntellectual property rights circumscribe the use of knowledge and thus, al-
most necessarily, cause inefficiency.").
22. In 2010, the United Nations (U.N.) reported decreases in the number of deaths
attributed to HIV/AIDS and malaria, crediting in part pharmaceutical intervention. U.N.
DEP'T OF EcoN. & Soc. AFFAIRS, THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT, at 41,
48, U.N. Sales No. E.10.I.7 (2010) (finding that "the number of people living with the [AIDS]
virus is still rising, largely due to the life-sustaining impact of antiretroviral therapy" and that
"African countries that have achieved high coverage of their populations in terms of bed nets
and treatment programmes"-which can include "access to new combinations of antimalarial
medications"-"have recorded decreases in malaria cases"). The report also notes that tuber-
culosis mortality rates are related to "the lack of antiretroviral therapy." Id. at 51.
23. The ability to raise prices is related both to the market and to the scope of the patent
grant. See Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REv. 523, 545-46 (2010).
24. See, e.g., World Health Organization (WHO), Comm'n on Intell. Prop. Rights,
Innovation & Pub. Health (CIPIH), Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property
Rights, at 20 (2006) [hereinafter CIPIH Report], available at http://www.who.int/
intellectualproperty/report/en ("[W]here most consumers of health products are poor, as are
the great majority in developing countries, the monopoly costs associated with patents can
limit the affordability of patented health-care products required by poor people in the absence
of other measures to reduce prices or increase funding."); Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing
Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1047-49 (2005) (detailing how patent rights can render treat-
ments unavailable for impoverished populations by raising drug prices).
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pharmaceutical products) 5 Moreover, the prominence of patents has
greatly increased through the adoption of international trade agreements
that require reasonably strong patent systems, with the Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement being the
most prominent.26 Thus, developing country governments and members
of civil society have focused on breaking patents through the TRIPS
framework as an important means of increasing the delivery of low-cost
medicines.
As noted earlier, the literature on access to medicines and TRIPS is
massive and it is unnecessary to recount the entire history here. A few
summary highlights can provide the necessary context. Immediately fol-
lowing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rounds that
produced both the WTO and TRIPS, the global aid community viewed
this intellectual property agreement as unduly restrictive when it came to
essential medicines.2 ' TRIPS required members to provide patent protec-
tion to all inventions without prejudice.29 Various countries that had
excluded pharmaceutical compounds from protection were now required
to permit patents, cutting off important sources of generic pharmaceuti-
cals.o In addition, the relatively detailed provisions in TRIPS that
allowed for the use of patented inventions without the authorization of
the patent owner were restricted to primarily supplying the domestic
market." This meant that nations unable to manufacture generic pharma-
ceuticals domestically were unable to make much use of TRIPS
flexibilities. During the Doha round of trade negotiations, WTO mem-
bers agreed that changes to TRIPS that would permit the export of
25. WHO, The World Medicines Situation, at 68-70, WHO Doc.
WHO/EDM/PAR/2004.5 (2004) [hereinafter WHO Medicines Situation] (noting that generic
medicines are usually much less expensive than patented medicines and providing examples
from several countries).
26. See Yu, supra note 20, at 858-62 (describing the enclosure of developing country
technology space by the TRIPS regime).
27. For a very nice overview of the issues and a comprehensive compilation of aca-
demic resources, see generally HOLGER HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO: THE
CASE OF PATENTS AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES (2007).
28. See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott & Rudolf V. Van Puymbroeck, Compulsory Licens-
ing for Public Health: A Guide and Model Documents for Implementation of the Doha
Declaration Paragraph 6 Decision 8-9 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 61, 2005).
29. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 27, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS] (declaring that, with the exception
of certain treatment and biologic subject matters, patents shall be available "in all fields of
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial
application").
30. Kapczynski, supra note 20, at 1579-80.
31. Richard Elliott, Delivering on the Pledge: Global Access to Medicines, WTO Rules,
and Reforming Canada's Law on Compulsory Licensing for Export, 3 McGILL INT'L J. Sus-
TAINABLE DEv. L. & POL'Y 23, 36; Abbott & Van Puymbroeck, supra note 28, at 8-9.
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licensed, low-cost pharmaceuticals to developing nations were neces-
sary.2 This produced the so-called Doha Declaration and its Paragraph 6
implementation that permitted countries to make exceptions in the com-
pulsory license export rules.
In the aftermath of the adoption of the Paragraph 6 decision, several
countries rushed to enact compulsory licensing legislation. 4 None was
more pronounced and proud than Canada. This country's regime serves
as an excellent encapsulation of the issues in patent breaking that re-
sulted in the system's current underutilization in the public health
context.
1. Canada's Access to Medicines Regime Leads the Way
Prime Minister Jean Chr6tien's government began work on legisla-
tion that would enact the TRIPS exception into Canadian law in 2003.'-
Part of a broader social agenda, the compulsory licensing legislation was
cast as a form of aid to the developing world.36 When the following gov-
ernment picked up the bill, it was christened the "Jean Chr6tien Pledge
to Africa Act," in recognition of the Prime Minister's tenure when the
bill was introduced." After much negotiation that included input from
industry, the government, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
32. WTO, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, IT 1, 2 & 6 (Nov.
14, 2001), WTIMIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]; WHO,
Dep't of Essential Drugs and Medicines Pol'y, Implementation of the WTO General Council
Decision on Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, WHO Doc. WHO/EDM/PAR/2004.4 (2004) (by Carlos M. Correa); Frederick M.
Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade and the Protection of
Public Health, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 317, 354-57 (2005).
33. WTO, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, Decision of 30 August 2003, 1(b) n.3, WT/U540 (2003)
[hereinafter Paragraph 6 Decision], available at http://www.wto.org/English/tratop-e/trips-e/
implem para6_e.htm.
34. See Amir Attaran, Why Canada's Access to Medicines Regime Can Never Succeed,
60 U.N.B. L.J. 150, 156-57 (2009) (noting that thirty-two countries have enacted legislation
to enable the Paragraph 6 decision).
35. See Kristina M. Lybecker & Elisabeth Fowler, Compulsory Licensing in Canada
and Thailand: Comparing Regimes to Ensure Legitimate Use of the WTO Rules, 37 J.L. MED.
& ETHics 222, 226-27 (2009) (describing the legislative history of the act); Elliott, supra note
31, at 41 (describing the push by Canadian non-governmental organizations and the United
Nations for Canada to implement the decision).
36. Lybecker & Fowler, supra note 35, at 226 ("It is one part of the Government of
Canada's broader strategy to assist countries in their struggle against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis,
malaria and other diseases.") (quoting Canada's Access to Medicines Regime, Gov'T OF CAN.,
http://www.camr-rcam.gc.calindex_e.html (last updated Dec. 14, 2007)); Amir Attaran, A
Tragically Naive Canadian Law for Tragically Neglected Global Health, 176 CAN. MED.
Ass'N J. 1726, 1726 (2007).
37. Elliott, supra note 31, at 41.
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the bill was passed into law in 2004 as Canada's Access to Medicines
Regime (CAMR)."
This regime is restricted to a specific list of drugs (that can be
amended) and a small list of least-developed countries." Countries wish-
ing to use CAMR must partner with a Canadian pharmaceutical
company that is prepared to manufacture the requested drug, and a re-
quest must be formally filed with the government.40 The approval of
Health Canada-Canada's health ministry-is also necessary before any
generic drug can be shipped. 4' Although somewhat bureaucratic, the de-
tailed and structured regime was at the time of its passage perceived to
be an important step in fulfilling the promise of the Paragraph 6 negotia-
tions.
Following Canada's lead, several other industrialized countries and
regions, including the European Union, enacted similar legislation.42
These provisions have the same TRIPS-mandated basic structure, requir-
ing a specific country to make a licensing request before generic
manufacture can commence. Some specific provisions, such as a list of
approved drugs or licensees may differ, but the functionality should be
essentially equivalent.
Unfortunately, the use of CAMR and similarly enacted provisions in
other countries has fallen dramatically short of expectations. Canada's
legislation has been used only once, for a combination HIV/AIDS ther-
apy to be exported to Rwanda.M No other country's Paragraph 6
legislation has been used at all.45 Moreover, the participants in Canada's
one transaction have indicated that they have no intent to engage in the
process again.46 The arguments, discussed below, have centered on the
38. Lybecker & Fowler, supra note 35, at 222.
39. Id. at 226.
40. Canada's Access to Medicines Regime: Requirements for Companies, GOV'T OF
CAN., http://www.camr-rcam.gc.calcompan-entrepris/req-exig/index-e.html (last updated July
28, 2006).
41. Id.
42. Attaran, supra note 34, at 156-57.
43. TRIPS, supra note 29, art. 31(a) (providing that licenses must be considered on
individual merits).
44. Abbott & Reichman, supra note 8, at 933.
45. Attaran, supra note 34, at 156-57; Lybecker & Fowler, supra note 35, at 227.
46. See Press Release, Apotex, CAMR Federal Law Needs to Be Fixed If Life-Saving
Drugs for Children Are to Be Developed (May 14, 2009), available at
http://www.apotex.com/global/about/press/20090514.asp ("For Apotex, the time and costs
involved were high and the company stated it was reluctant to do it again if changes are not
made to streamline CAMR.").
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complex nature of the process,47 though it is unclear whether this is truly
the problem.48
As a result of Canada's experiences, disappointment with the ar-
rangement has grown 49 and many policy advocates have all but
abandoned the process as a development focal point. They appear to
have turned their attention to other initiatives, leaving the access to med-
icines regimes fallow.
2. Shifting NGO Priorities
Without a doubt, one of the most important forces behind the Para-
graph 6 amendment to TRIPS and the various national enactments has
been the NGO community.o Its support is a critical component of the in-
ternational will to use such legal powers, and a shift in the collective focus
of the NGO community can have a great impact. Considered in this con-
text, it is particularly interesting that, very close to the time that Canada
passed CAMR, a migration appears to have occurred in the NGO commu-
nity. More organizations began touting alternative mechanisms for
delivering low-cost medicines and improving health, thus pushing compul-
sory licensing to the relative background." First among these alternatives
were the patent prize proposals, systems in which governments would pay
to buy out important patented inventions and remove them from private
control.52 This was quickly followed by patent pool proposals, which
would utilize a well-established mechanism for non-exclusive licensing of
technology, usually owned by more than one company.53 Additional ideas
47. GOV'T OF CANADA, REPORT ON THE STATUTORY REVIEW OF SECTIONS 21.01 TO
21.19 OF THE PATENT ACT 29-31 (2007) [hereinafter CAMR REVIEW] (noting that stake-
holders indicate that more permissive regimes are necessary to encourage licensing).
48. See Attaran, supra note 34, at 157-58.
49. See Lamy, supra note 11, 14-15.
50. See Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics
of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 835-36 (2008) (describing the substantial impact
of activist organizations on intellectual property law).
51. This movement tends to be cast in terms of dissatisfaction with the existing patent
regime and the need to find alternatives to provide the same research and development output.
See, e.g., James Love, Measures to Enhance Access to Medical Technologies, and New Meth-
ods of Stimulating Medical R&D, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 679, 699-710 (2007) (describing
various options for innovation in the context of medicine that do not rely on traditional patent
protection).
52. See, e.g., James Love & Tim Hubbard, Prizes for Innovation in New Medicines and
Vaccines, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 155 (2009). But see Michael Abramowicz, Patent Prizes, 56
VAND. L. REV. 115, 170-71 (2003) (introducing a detailed discussion as to why such "patent
prize" systems are inherently flawed).
53. See, e.g., UNITAID, The Medicines Patent Pool Initiative, http://www.unitaid.eu/en/
projects-mainmenu-3/medicines-patent-pool-mainmenu-1 18.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2011)
(describing the 2008 decision of the UNITAID Executive Board "to establish a voluntary
patent pool for medicines"). For a more detailed evaluation of UNITAID's Patent Pool Initia-
tive, see THE INNOVATION PARTNERSHIP (TIP), PRELIMINARY LEGAL REVIEW OF PROPOSED
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included the Health Impact Fund," a variation on the patent prize idea
requiring a participating government to reward registered drugs based on
their health care impact while mandating these drugs be sold at the cost of
production, and the Medical Research and Development Treaty," which
would commit governments to minimum standards of investment in medi-
cal research. None of these alternative mechanisms have been employed,
and it is therefore not clear that any are viable. They may turn out to be
significantly more viable than compulsory licensing. Irrespective of their
viability, they have diverted a great deal of academic and civil society at-
tention away from the existing compulsory license regimes.
Why has the NGO community begun to shift away from compulsory
license initiatives? One reason may be the lack of prominent impact. As
almost no compulsory licensing activity has occurred, and as noted
above, very little is expected in the future, continued association with
these mechanisms carries the stench of failure. In a related vein, it has
been argued that the compulsory license regimes in place were con-
structed as the result of consensus negotiation, and as such are so fatally
flawed that they cannot be pursued any further.17 Another reason may be
that the legal process has been taken as far as it possibly can. There is no
further need for advocacy related to implementing access to medicines
regimes; if there is a need, existing systems are arranged to function
right now. Finally, the supporting academic community, which was
highly concerned about empowering compulsory licensing a decade ago,
seems to have shifted its focus to new treaty initiatives like the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement. Such initiatives can impact compul-
sory licensing," but are not directly related to encouraging its use.
MEDICINES PATENT POOL (2007), available at http://www.theinnovationpartnership.org/datal
documents/00000003- .pdf.
54. AIDAN HOLLIS & THOMAS POGGE, THE HEALTH IMPACT FUND: MAKING NEW
MEDICINES AVAILABLE FOR ALL (2008), available at http://www.yale.edulmacmillan/igh/
hifbook.pdf.
55. See Laurence R. Helfer, Toward a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Prop-
erty, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971, 1007-09 (2007) (describing a proposal for a Medical
Research and Development Treaty forwarded by "a coalition of more than 150 NGOs, public
health experts, economics and legal scholars").
56. Although one could argue that these various mechanisms have moved forward some
interesting policy debates, very few concrete changes have been effected. See E. Richard Gold
& Jean-Fr6d6ric Morin, The Missing Ingredient in Medicine Patent Pools, 374 LANCET 1329,
1330 (2009).
57. See generally Jean-Frdd6ric Morin & Edward Richard Gold, Consensus-Seeking,
Distrust, and Rhetorical Entrapment: The WTO Decision on Access to Medicines (July 18,
2009) (working paper), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1435747.
58. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Public Predecisional/Deliberative Draft
(Apr. 2010), available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfmsend/1883.
59. See generally Margot Kaminski, Recent Development, The Origins and Potential
Impact of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 247 (2009).
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Interestingly, Canada remains one country where NGOs are focused
on compulsory licenses. Recent initiatives to amend CAMR have been
strongly supported by groups such as the Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal
Network and Oxfam Canada.w But despite their support, these groups
generally declare that the current system is unworkable and advocate for
61a less narrow and less regulated system. To the extent that their ideal
regime exceeds what is currently permitted under the traditional under-
standing of TRIPS, the Canadian NGO community could be viewed as
attempting to encourage a national approach that promotes a more ex-
pansive reading of the agreement. Perhaps they see an opening in the
Canadian political environment for change that could make compulsory
licensing a more relevant force in the market. In any case, it is unclear
that these revisions will be adopted, 6 and in the present state, Canadian
compulsory licensing to provide access to essential medicines is-along
with the rest of the world-stalled.
In the end, most would conclude that, to date, breaking patents as a
means for addressing shortfalls has not been as effective as imagined. If
the world were simply left with an unused mechanism having only nar-
row, theoretical utility, it might be acceptable. But some actors have
found ways to take advantage of the flexibilities to serve other purposes.
B. Politics and Opportunism
The next story is essentially the opposite of the access to medicines
conundrum. It primarily involves countries that may be described as de-
60. See, e.g., 144 HANSARD 74, H.C., 40th Parl., 2d sess., (June 12, 2009) (Can.) (com-
ments of Judy Wasylicia-Leis, M.P., describing Bill C-393, her legislation to amend the
CAMR, and thanking "the Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, Results Canada, Stephen
Lewis Foundation and Oxfam Canada" for support).
61. See, e.g., Richard Elliott, Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, Making CAMR
Work: Streamlining Canada's Access to Medicines Regime, Brief to Senate Banking Trade
and Commerce Committee Regarding Bill S-232, at 3-4 (Oct. 21, 2009), available at
http://www.aidslaw.ca/publications/interfaces/downloadFile.php?ref=1563 (declaring that the
CAMR cannot be declared a success and advocating for an amendment to make it workable).
62. See CAMR REVIEW, supra note 47, at 34-35 (discussing the so-called "one li-
cense" plan advocated by activists that would eliminate the need for a particular country to
come forward before a generic producer created a medicine, and why such a plan likely con-
flicts with Canada's TRIPS obligations).
63. Efforts to reform CAMR have been recently reinvigorated. A bill containing several
reforms, C-393, was passed by the Canadian House of Commons on March 9, 2011. Act to
Amend the Patent Act, C-393, 40th Parl. (2011) (Can.), available at http://www2.parl.gc.cal
Sites/LOP/LEGISINFO/index.asp?Language=E&query=6829&List=toc. However, Canada's
government fell before the bill could be passed in the Senate. See Ian Austen, Canadian Gov-
ernment, Harried by Scandal, Collapses, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 26, 2011, at A6 (detailing the
collapse of Canada's government on March 25).
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veloping,64 but are not dramatically economically disadvantaged. They
have serious economic issues, but may also have budgets that could per-
mit the purchase of essential goods.65 For example, China is now the
world's second largest economy, yet it considers itself "developing" due
to its relatively low per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP).6 6 Almost
every year, one of these middle-developed countries publicly threatens to
"break" the patent rights of a large multinational company. These rights
are often related to medical products like pharmaceuticals, and the
rationale is almost always to obtain lower prices. Recently joining the
club-which includes Egypt, 6  Thailand,65  and Brazil9 among its
64. The term "developing country" is actually self-designated under the WTO regime.
See Who Are the Developing Countries in the WTO?, WTO, http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop e/devel e/dlwhoe.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2011). As of 2001, the following
countries indicated their intent to claim "developing" status: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina,
Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon, Chile,
Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, C6te d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Dominica, Dominican Republic,
Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras,
Hong Kong, China, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Macau, Malay-
sia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Saint Lucia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, St.
Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. See also
Frequently Asked Questions About TRIPS, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/
tripfqe.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2011). However, the list is not necessarily exhaustive or
binding. "Developing" status in the WTO is distinct from "least-developed countries," a des-
ignation rendered by the United Nations and recognized by the WTO for countries that are
disadvantaged in their development and in need of international assistance. Least-Developed
Countries, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif e/org7_e.htm (last visited
Feb. 25, 2011). The current list of least-developed countries includes: Angola, Bangladesh,
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Re-
public of the Congo, Djibouti, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Lesotho, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Solomon Islands, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia. Id.
65. One way to assess a country's specific level of development with respect to eco-
nomic ability is to consult the U.N. Human Development Index. See U.N. Dev. Programme,
Human Development Report 2009, at 142-202 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 UN-HDR], available
at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2009_ENIndicators.pdf. Poverty levels and income are
listed, id. at 176-80 tbls.II & 12, as is health care spending, id. at 199-202 tbl.N.
66. News Release, Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of
America, China's Developing-Country Identity Remains Unchanged (Aug. 13, 2010), avail-
able at http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/gdxw/t723893.htm.
67. Richard A. Castellano, Note, Patent Law for New Medical Uses of Known Com-
pounds and Pfizer's Viagra Patent, 46 IDEA 283, 289 (2006); Abeer Allam, Seeking
Investment, Egypt Tries Patent Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2002, at W1.
68. See Nicholas Zamiska, Thai Move to Trim Drug Costs Highlights Growing Patent
Rift, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2007, at A8; Announcement of the Dep't of Disease Control, Minis-
try of Pub. Health, Thailand on the Public Use of Patent for Pharmaceutical Products (Nov. 29,
2006) [hereinafter Thail. Efavirenz C.L.], available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/
thailand/thaicl4efavirenz.html.
69. Abbott & Reichman, supra note 8, at 950-52 (describing the conditions related to
Brazil's compulsory licensing of Efavirenz in 2007).
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members-was Ecuador, which in October 2009, declared its intent to
issue a compulsory license to, inter alia, produce generic versions of
several unnamed patented drugs.o The first license was actually issued in
April 2010."
While Ecuador's compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals received
the most press, perhaps the more interesting but often overlooked aspect
of the initiative is that it was explicitly broader in scope than essential
medicines and intended to serve a more general political agenda. For
example, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa has stressed that that the
licenses would be extended to agrochemicals next. 72 This declaration was
prominently linked from the home page of Ecuador's government office
for intellectual property, the Instituto Ecuatoriano de la Propiedad In-
telectual (IEPI).7 ' A translation of one of President Correa's speeches,
posted by Essentialaction.org, goes further, noting Correa's interest in
extending the licenses to "everything possible," and that "[i]ntellectual
property is a mechanism for development for the people. This is our vi-
sion of intellectual property. It's not a mechanism to enrich the
pharmaceutical or agrochemical companies. It's a mechanism for devel-
opment for the people."74 While such an informal translation may not
perfectly capture the Ecuadorian government's intent, Correa has ex-
pressed elsewhere the belief that "knowledge is a public good that
cannot be privatized."" It seems clear that Ecuador's goals in licensing
are more extensive than increasing access to medicines. To avoid barriers
from patent owners, Ecuador was able to use Article 31 of the standard
text of TRIPS.7 6 This article permits public non-commercial use of pat-
70. See Jeanneth Valdivieso, Ecuador to Make Cheap Versions of Patented Drugs, As-
SOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 28, 2009, available at 10/28/09 APALERTPOLITICS 21:16:15
(Westlaw).
71. Catherine Saez, Ecuador Grants First Compulsory License for HIV/AIDS Drug,
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2010/04/22/ecuador-
grants-first-compulsory-licence-for-hivaids-drug.
72. Licencias Obligatorias, REP6BLICA DEL ECUADOR, INSTITUTo ECUATORIANO DE LA
PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL, http://www.iepi.gob.ec/index.php?option=com _content&view=
article&id=59:1icencias-obligatorias&catid=l:ultimas-noticias&Itemid=50 (last visited Mar.
14, 2011) (translation on file with author).
73. INSTITUTo ECUATORIANO DE LA PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL, http://www.iepi.gob.ec
(last visited Mar. 14, 2011).
74. Essential Action, Ecuador's Compulsory Licensing Plan and Alternate Vision for IP,
ESSENTIAL INFO. (Oct. 5, 2009), http://www.essentialaction.org/access/index.php?/archives/
224-Ecuadors-compulsory-licensing-plan-and-alternate-vision-for-IP.html.
75. La producci6n de medicamentos mds baratos se hace posible, ELCIUDADA-
NO.GOB.EC (Ecuador) (Oct. 27, 2009), http://www.elciudadano.gov.ec/index.php?option=
corncontent&view=article&id=7035:la-produccion-de-medicamentos-mas-baratos-se-hace-
posible&catid=1:actualidad (translation on file with author).
76. TRIPS, supra note 29, art. 31.
474 [Vol. 32:461
ented products without any prior negotiation with the patent owner.7
Additionally, Ecuador will arrange for compensation related to any pat-
ent it licenses.7 ' Despite the fact that Ecuador's move is not clearly for an
emergency purpose, it appears to be entirely TRIPS-compliant. 9
Although the immediate reaction to Ecuador's statement was pre-
dictably dichotomous, it was not as contentious as the reaction that
greeted similar pronouncements by Brazil and Thailand." Not surpris-
ingly, members of the NGO community touted Ecuador's move as a
positive event (although they rarely mentioned the licensing of agro-
chemicals).82 However, the business community was uncharacteristically
restrained. In fact, in response to an early report of President Correa's
announcement, the local pharmaceutical industry trade association repre-
senting GSK, Pfizer, and Bayer stated: "We accept the democratic
decision . . . to use this extraordinary legal measure, observing the rights
and responsibilities laid out in international law.""
Regardless of the business community's acquiescence, one might
view Ecuador's move with skepticism.84 A strict property rights advocate
might argue that such economically stable nations could pay developing
country market prices for patented pharmaceuticals or agrochemicals (as
they do for other goods), and the TRIPS mechanism simply provides a
legal procedure for discounting (albeit in socially important areas). For
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Saez, supra note 71 (explaining the remuneration process in Ecuador's
first compulsory license).
79. Compulsory licensing under TRIPS requires neither prior negotiation with
the patent holder nor a declared emergency. See id.; see also Essential Action, Back-
grounder, Ecuador's Presidential Declaration on Access to Medicines and Compulsory
Licensing, ESSENTIAL INFO. (Oct. 27, 2009), http://www.essentialaction.org/access/uploads/
EcuadorPresidentialdeclarationbackgrounder.pdf.
80. See Saez, supra note 71.
81. See Christopher Gibson, A Look at the Compulsory License in Investment Arbitra-
tion: The Case of Indirect Expropriation, 25 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 357, 372-73 (2010)
(noting that Brazil's issuance of a compulsory license was controversial, and even termed an
"expropriation" by forced licensor, Merck); Cynthia M. Ho, Patent Breaking or Balancing?:
Separating Strands of Fact from Fiction Under TRIPS, 34 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 371,
419-24 (2009) (detailing various criticisms of Thailand's compulsory licenses).
82. See, e.g., Kanaga Raja, Praise for Ecuador's Grant of Compulsory License for
AIDS Drug, PEOPLE's HEALTH MOVEMENT (May 4, 2010), http://www.phmovement.org/
en/node/2883 ("Civil society organizations have praised a recent decision by the Ecuadorian
government to issue its first compulsory license.
83. Valdivieso, supra note 70.
84. The United States elected to keep Ecuador on its watch list for 2010 as a result of
various concerns regarding its enforcement of intellectual property. U.S. TRADE REP., 2010
SPECIAL 301 REPORT 31 [hereinafter 2010 SPECIAL 301], available at http://www.ustr.gov/
webfmsend/1906. Regarding the compulsory license, it states: "The United States will con-
tinue to monitor recent developments concerning compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical and
agricultural chemical products in Ecuador, bearing in mind the discussion of the Doha Decla-
ration on TRIPS and Public Health in Section I of this report." Id.
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reference, Ecuador is designated as a "high human development" coun-
try on the U.N. Human Development Index, ranking 80 out of 177
countries, and ranks 38 out of the 135 countries on the U.N. Human
Poverty Index, two rankings below China and two above Turkey." How-
ever, the U.N. Human Development Index indicates that its health care
spending is comparatively low, listed at only $130 per capita, below
some countries designated least-developed such as Rwanda ($134 per
capita).86
In addition, though public interest is likely the primary motivator in
Ecuador's decision, it is possible that there are other influences. For ex-
ample, the U.S. State Department notes that Ecuador announced in
December of 2009 its intent to establish a national pharmaceutical com-
pany (ENFARMA) that will produce generic drugs.8 Creating this
company may imply a desire to develop a stronger domestic industry.
The pursuit of a broader populist agenda through the threat of nationali-
zation, in concert with other regional powers, could be gleaned from the
government's public statements in other areas as well.
In the end, if Ecuador's decision has been essentially accepted by the
relevant business communities, and it is TRIPS-compliant, is there a
problem? Isolated to an individual country, the effects may be small, and
certainly there is global moral interest in seeing the Ecuadorian people
increase their standard of living and health. But more broadly applied,
Ecuador's actions introduce an element of unpredictability into the pat-
ent system that could undermine innovation. The reason is that, under
current international law, obligations to fairly license are so vague as to
be non-existent. 9 While the TRIPS agreement does require "adequate
remuneration," this has been interpreted to be as low as 0.5% of sales in
85. 2009 UN-HDR, supra note 65, at 176-77 tbl.I1. The Human Development Index
ranking is carried through on each of the tables.
86. Id. at 200-01 tbl.N.
87. Bureau of Econ., Energy & Bus. Affairs, 2010 Investment Climate Statement-
Ecuador, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (Mar. 2010), http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othrlics/2010/
138060.htm.
88. See, e.g., Mercedes Alvaro, Ecuador Demands Oil Revenue-Venezuela Ally
Threatens to Expropriate Companies' Holdings if They Don't Agree, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19,
2010, at Al0 (linking the Ecuadorian government to Venezuela and suggesting a pattern of
nationalization to shore up a populist image). Recently, President Correa's public image was
bolstered when he survived an alleged coup attempt by police forces in Quito. Simon Romero,
Debate Over Meaning of Standoff in Ecuador, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2010, at A4. Critics subse-
quently argued that Correa may have exacerbated the confrontation "to promote an image as a
decisive and fearless leader." Robert Kozak & Mercedes Alvaro, Ecuador's Top Cop Quits
After President Held, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2010, at A8.
89. See Cahoy, supra note 8, at 173-77 (describing a "unitary system" of compulsory
license remuneration that permits both developed and developing countries to license at dis-
count rates in their own interests rather than equity).
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the case of Thailand," a decision that was not disputed at the WTO. It is
hard to imagine that there is actually any lower limit as long as the roy-
alty is above zero. Any investment incentive that patent holders believed
they could derive from their Ecuadorian patents has been eliminated and
substituted with something akin to largess.
The issue is not about Ecuador, per se, but about the misaligned in-
centives in the current TRIPS framework. In essence, countries are able
to circumvent the market and revise the bargaining rules as they see fit,
while fully complying with Article 31. Instead of a uniform and equita-
ble system, power and insulation from the withdrawal of foreign direct
investment give advantages to some countries over others.9' This arbi-
trary advantage is antithetical to the notion of an international system of
rules. Arguably, countries that do not take advantage of the TRIPS flexi-
bilities are missing out on a financial goldmine.
Going forward, there are risks for innovation investment in the de-
veloping world. The message sent to multinational corporations is that
there is an inherent risk in marketing important technologies in middle-
developed countries; in other words, that efforts may be more profitably
focused on inventions less critical to the survival of humanity or that
marketing may beneficially be restricted to more secure environments. In
either case, the world loses.
As a final point, consider that even if one were inclined to give all
developing nations a pass on the TRIPS remuneration ambiguities due to
their real economic difficulties and the existence of a broader global
market, the same remuneration discount could be applied by developed
nations like the United States. Referring back to the Boeing example at
the outset of this Article," suppose the United States decided to use its
patent compensation statute as a discount mechanism. There is evidence
that the United States specifically reserved the ability to use TRIPS Arti-
cle 31 under its traditional government infringement compensation
scheme.3 While most would not argue for the U.S. government's right to
discount patented goods through compulsory licensing, it used exactly
this type of leverage when it found itself in need of a large amount of
ciprofloxacin and was reluctant to pay patent owner Bayer AG's market
90. Thail. Efavirenz C.L., supra note 68 (detailing conditions for government use of a
patented anti-retroviral medicine used to treat HIV/AIDS).
91. See Robert Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Impact of Compulsory Licensing on For-
eign Direct Investment: A Collective Bargaining Approach, 45 Am. Bus. L.J. 283, 309-17
(2008) (describing Brazil's resistance to foreign direct investment retribution as a shield to its
compulsory licensing strategy).
92. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2006).
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price.' The lack of neutral control over the remuneration structure-and
the rise of political power as a factor--could lead to substantial inequity
and unintended externalities.
C. The Future Disasters
If the above stories depict the patent breaking mechanism in a nega-
tive light, perhaps one could defend the mechanism by focusing on the
circumstances wherein compulsory licensing is the most necessary and
useful. While it can be fairly observed that breaking patents serves many
purposes, including the maintenance of competitive markets" and
efficient government procurement, it appears that an important consid-
eration in drafting the detailed compulsory license rules in the TRIPS
text and the Paragraph 6 implementation was to permit governments to
respond to emergencies. 7 The notion that a patent could prevent a gov-
ernment from coming to the aid of its citizens is odious, to be sure, and
there is much in the negotiation record to suggest that this was well-
recognized. 8 The final story is therefore somewhat shocking in that it
reveals current procedures are so ambiguous, unclear, and disdained that
we are in no position to respond to a worldwide crisis.
In 2009, it became almost impossible to escape talk of a global pan-
demic of swine flu. Technically, the pandemic actually happened by the
fall of that year (using the World Health Organization (WHO) definition"),
94. Daniel R. Cahoy, Treating the Legal Side Effects of Cipro@: A Reevaluation of
Compensation Rules for Government Takings of Patent Rights, 40 AM. Bus. L.J. 125, 127
(2002).
95. See, e.g., Carlos M. Correa, Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory
Licenses: Options for Developing Countries 10-22 (Ctr. for Advanced Studies at the Univ. of
Buenos Aires, Arg., Working Paper No. 5, 1999), available at http://www.southeentre.org/
publications/workingpapers/wp05.pdf.
96. Thomas F. Mullin, Note, AIDS, Anthrax, and Compulsory Licensing: Has the Unit-
ed States Learned Anything? A Comment on Recent Decisions on the International
Intellectual Property Rights of Pharmaceutical Patents, 9 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 185, 192
(2002) (describing various advantages to a government that uses or even threatens compulsory
licensing).
97. The text of the TRIPS agreement does not enumerate all possible reasons for com-
pulsory licenses, but it does clearly highlight the "case of a national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency." TRIPS, supra note 29, art. 31(b). Note that a common
misinterpretation of Article 31 is that an emergency is required before licensing. The enumera-
tion of several other justifications for licensing demonstrates that this is clearly not the case.
98. UNCTAD-ICTSD RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 7, at 464 (noting that an early draft
limited the grounds for licensing to "public interest concerning national security, or critical
peril to life of the general public or body thereof").
99. The International Response to the Influenza Pandemic, WHO (June 10, 2010),
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/notes/briefing_20100610/en/index.html (responding
to critics that the WHO definition of pandemic is too broad).
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but it was not as deadly as some had feared.'" Still, demand increased for
flu-related goods such as vaccineo and hand sanitizer.' 02 There was great
concern that certain flu treatments would be in short supply or even un-
available if events took a substantial turn for the worse. One of the most
prominent medicines was Tamiflu, an antiviral pharmaceutical created
and patented by Roche pharmaceuticals.os In October 2009, American
officials noted that Tamiflu could be a very important treatment'" and
that they could supply the drug in an emergency. To the extent that the
need outstripped the capacity of Roche to supply the drug, such a meas-
ure could involve acquiring generic sources. However, in response to an
inquiry about the potential emergency need, the only producer of generic
Tamiflu (known as "Antiflu"), India's Cipla Pharmaceuticals, explained
that it would take time to gain approval for the drug through the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration and noted that it had no interest in starting the
process due to existing patents (and the lack of a license).o Here, reti-
cence to enact a compulsory license by an industrialized nation like the
United States effectively put the entire process in jeopardy to some degree.
Disasters can be progressive as well. In contrast to flu, which varies
widely in its potential severity from year to year, the world has been on
notice of the advancing effects of global climate change for quite some
time. Some believe that climate change will create shortages of food or
water, in addition to many other habitat-related impacts. Across the
globe, technology has been developed to ameliorate the impacts of cli-
mate change. For example, agricultural biotechnology companies like
Monsanto and BASF are reportedly developing crops that are genetically
100. See, e.g., Donald G. McNeil Jr., Flu Death, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 12, 2009, at 13,
available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-l1-12/news/0911110830_1_swine-flu-
seasonal-flu-cdc-spokesman (stating that, even though estimates of the number of Americans
that died from swine flu by November were approximately 4,000, the total number of deaths
caused by the pandemic is estimated to be far less than originally predicted).
101. See Thomas H. Maugh II, HIN1 Spread Now Global, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 6, 2009,
at 27, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-ll-06/news/0911060151-l
pandemic-hIn -swine-flu-flu-vaccine (reporting on world-wide shortages of flu vaccine).
102. Rob Varnon, Sanitizer Demand Outpaces Supply at Local Colleges, CONN. POST
ONLINE (Nov. 24, 2009, 8:17 PM), http://www.ctpost.com/default/article/Sanitizer-demand-
outpaces-supply-at-local-colleges-264964.php.
103. See Rob Stein, Tamiflu Shortages Have Parents on Wild Dose Chase, WASH. POST,
Oct. 29, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2009/10/28/AR2009102803823_pf.html.
104. See 2009 HIN1 and Seasonal Flu: What You Should Know About Flu Antiviral
Drugs, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Oct. 8, 2009, 2:00 PM),
http://www.cdc.gov/H1Nlflulantivirals/geninfo.htm (recommending Tamiflu and Relenza as
"a second line of defense against the flu").
105. See Morning Edition: Will Tamiflu Shortage Drive U.S. to India's Version? (NPR
radio broadcast Nov. 10, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.npr.org/templates/
transcript/transcript.php?storyld=120254536).
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engineered to grow in very dry climates.'" It is reasonable to assume that
much of the groundbreaking climate change technology will be pat-
ented.' 7 Leading up to the 2009 international climate talks in
Copenhagen, a group of seventy-seven developing nations led by China
forwarded the idea of making climate change technology subject to
compulsory licenses.'" But very few countries have moved forward on
any concrete plan to access such technology by breaking patents.'0
The reasons behind the hesitancy in the patent breaking discussion
are probably rooted partly in the ambiguity of the rules and the retribu-
tion countries may face for undertaking such a measure."o But such fear
means that countries are not preparing for an emergent eventuality.
While an opportunist's actions may have a detrimental impact if they
reflect only cost-cutting in response to the normal business environment,
the failure to establish a system for responding to an emergency could
have far worse consequences.
II. TAKEAWAY LESSONS TO GUIDE FUTURE REFORM
The three stories discussed above expose three very different problems
with the way compulsory licensing is conceptualized on an international
scale. These issues end up fundamentally hobbling the system, frustrating
civil society advocates and provoking disdain from patent owners."' But
rather than simply demonstrating that the current system is not functional,
these stories highlight lessons or principles that can be used for reform. By
understanding what does not work and why, we can make a healthier pat-
ent breaking regime and generate greater social utility.
The lessons all essentially relate to human behavior in one way or
another. Better explanations could be modeled with a more complex
106. See Rajesh Chhabara, Climate Ready GM Crops: The Patent Race, CLIMATE-
CHANGECORP.COM (Sept. 17, 2008), http://www.climatechangecorp.com/content-print.asp?
ContentlD=5644 (explaining that biotechnology companies are flooding patent offices with
applications for "genetically engineered climate-resistant seeds [that] can withstand catastro-
phic effects of global warming, such as floods, drought, heat, cold and salinity").
107. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Comment, Addressing the Green Patent Global
Deadlock Through Bayh-Dole Reform, 119 YALE L.J. 1727, 1727-28 (2010) (noting that de-
veloping countries have recognized that patents can limit access to green technologies).
108. See id.; China, India Push for 'Patent Fee'Green Tech, EuRAcriv (Nov. 23, 2009),
http://www.euractiv.com/en/innovation/china-india-push-patent-free-green-tech/article-
187567.
109. In fact, the U.S. House of Representatives has entertained legislation to thwart such
compulsory licenses. See Matthew Rimmer, The Road to Copenhagen: Intellectual Property
and Climate Change, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. & PRAC. 784 (2009).
110. See Fair, supra note 10, at 33-34 (describing the economic backlashes that might
result from compulsory licenses on green technology).
Ill. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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behavioral theory, but this short sketch is sufficient to begin the conver-
sation. The lessons can be divided into (1) understanding market
structure, (2) appreciating profit-seeking behavior, and (3) maximizing
the certainty of a well-defined legal regime. If followed, the lessons
should fundamentally transform the use of the compulsory licensing.
A. Compulsory Licenses Will Be Underutilized as Long-Term
Humanitarian Relief
In order for a compulsory license to be an attractive option, there
must be a substantial and sustained difference in the price of the patented
good and the costs of manufacturing a licensed good. This is particularly
true if a for-profit company will be manufacturing under the license
(which would be the case unless a government-owned facility is in-
volved).112 Such a company must be able to pay a royalty, offer a price
advantage, and still obtain a profit (see Figure 1).
FIGURE 1
COMPULSORY LICENSE ECONOMICS IN A GIVEN MARKET
Generic
Revenue (GR)
P - --------- - --- Patentee




Products Sold Q QCL
Compulsory licensing, wherein access increases from Q to Qcl depends on a profit gap (PG)
existing in a particular market. In cases where a licensee's marginal costs (MCcl), transaction
costs (TCcl) and paid royalty (Rel) take a significant piece of the patent owner's or generic com-
petitor's profits (P-MC), the profit gap may be small or nonexistent. But note that a voluntary
license may substantially eliminate the transaction costs of a compulsory license. Additionally,
manufacture by the patent owner eliminates both transaction costs and the royalty costs, creating
the possibility that it may distribute products substantially above Qcl and make a small profit.
112. See, e.g., Lybecker & Fowler, supra note 35, at 229 (noting that Thailand's compul-
sory licenses were handled by the Government Pharmaceutical Organization).
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But the existence of such a "profit gap" depends on a patentee's mo-
nopoly power in the relevant markets as well as its inability or
unwillingness to take advantage of revenue opportunities by engaging in
differential pricing. These conditions have not historically occurred in
the context of least-developed countries. And, as described below, there
is good reason to believe that they may not occur in the future. The ab-
sence of such a profit gap will mean that compulsory licensing may have
minimal utility as a humanitarian aid mechanism. Although the
underutilization may cause many to conclude that the mechanism is a
failure in need of radical reform, what is really going on is a simple mis-
application of a specialized tool.
Consider as the prime example the access to medicines initiatives."3
Advocates believed that drugs to treat conditions disproportionately im-
pacting the developing world--especially HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and
malaria-were too expensive, and the reason was patent rights." 4 By re-
forming TRIPS to permit export of compulsorily licensed drugs, it was
presumed that generic companies in industrialized nations would rise not
simply to fill the need, but also to develop a profitable business by ex-
ploiting the difference between branded sales prices and the marginal
costs of manufacturing."' Advocates may have looked to industrialized
pharmaceutical markets as a model, in which branded and generic drugs
coexist.' Generic companies from developed countries could be let
loose to fill the need for low cost drugs.
In fact, this "gap market" for industrialized nation generics never
emerged. The most important reason is that the pricing disparity in least-
developed countries was not as linked to patent rights as first believed.'
113. Doha Declaration, supra note 32.
114. Susan Sell's contemporaneous article provides an excellent account of the politics
underlying the movement to utilize the TRIPS flexibilities. See Susan K. Sell, TRIPS and the
Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 Wis. INT'L L.J. 481, 496-98 (2001).
115. See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 8, at 970-71 (discussing the reasons why a
branded pharmaceutical company may not adopt a generic pricing model in developing coun-
tries).
116. See Puneet Manchanda et al., Understanding Firm, Physician and Consumer
Choice Behavior in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 16 MARKETING LETTERS 293, 302 (2005)
(noting that, although innovator sales drop sharply once a generic is on the market, prices for
branded drugs actually rise as innovators focus on a small, price insensitive part of the mar-
ket).
117. Attaran and Gillespie-White conducted one of the most discussed initial investiga-
tions into this phenomenon, demonstrating that patents did not pose a substantial barrier in
developing countries in Africa. Amir Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White, Do Patents for Antiretro-
viral Drugs Constrain Access to AIDS Treatment in Africa?, 286 JAMA 1886, 1891 (2001)
("[T]he extreme dearth of international aid finance, rather than patents, is most to blame for
the lack of antiretroviral treatment in Africa."). While this did not address the important ques-
tion of patents in exporting countries, it nevertheless involved an empirical look into a market
that was presumed to operate differently. Id.
482 [Vol. 32:461
When it came to purchasing the pharmaceuticals on the WHO Essential
Medicines List (EML) for treating HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, or malaria,
it became clear that patent rights did not severely restrict access to those
drugs in the most important countries."' Significantly, India, which insti-
tuted pharmaceutical product patent protection only in 2005,"' housed
several generic pharmaceutical companies that were prepared to produce
low-cost medicines on demand. 20 Governments and NGOs preferentially
purchased from Indian companies, obviating any need for industrialized-
country generics."' A second, equally important reason that the gap mar-
ket did not emerge is that branded companies have been increasingly
willing to lower their prices to compete with generic alternatives (or
simply to generate additional goodwill).122 Together, these actions essen-
tially caused the gap market to collapse over time.123 Governments that
had suggested compulsory licensing would benefit the impoverished
were left with little to show for their legislative efforts.
A review of the recent market environment for CAMR succinctly
makes this point. CAMR maintains a list of drugs that are, for the most
part, listed as patented in Canada 2 4 and are also on the WHO
118. See id.; Stephen H. Haber et al., On the Importance to Economic Success of Prop-
erty Rights in Finance and Innovation, 26 WASH U. J.L. & POL'Y 215, 240-41 (2008) (stating
that patents are not the source of problems in the developing world and that "95% of drugs on
the WHO's essential medicines list are off-patent"). More recent research has noted that the
impact of patents on essential medicines is likely more nuanced than Attaran and Gillespie's
original conclusion, as the WHO list was compiled with low cost in mind as opposed to sim-
ply effectiveness, and was thus more likely biased toward unpatented medicines. Rudolf V.
Van Puymbroeck, Basic Survival Needs and Access to Medicines-Coming to Grips with
TRIPS: Conversion + Calculation, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 520, 531 (2010). Also, a historical
review may be misleading because new additions to the WHO list may be under patent protec-
tion.
119. See Kapczynski, supra note 20, at 1586-88 (detailing the evolution of India's cur-
rent patent regime).
120. See CIPIH Report, supra note 24, at 83-85 (describing the development of India's
robust generic industry before pharmaceutical products were patentable); Lybecker & Fowler,
supra note 35, at 229 ("India is currently the principle [sic] supplier of essential medicines for
developing countries, exporting an estimated two-thirds of the drugs it produces.").
121. See Mark Schoofs, Clinton Foundation Sets Up Malaria-Drug Price Plan, WALL
ST. J., July 17, 2008, at A8 (detailing a pricing agreement to provide malaria drugs relying on
Indian generic companies).
122. See, e.g., Brenda Waning et al., Temporal Trends in Generic and Brand Prices of
Antiretroviral Medicines Procured with Donor Funds in Developing Countries, 7 J. GENERIC
MEDICINES 160, 168 (2010); Andrew Jack, GSK to Slash Drug Prices for Developing Coun-
tries, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2009, at 19; Andrew Jack, Pfizer Agrees to Cut Price of TB Drug,
FIN. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2009, at 16 (describing a growing willingness by research-based drug
companies to cut prices in order to expand business as well as increase access to medicines);
Schoofs, supra note 121, at A8.
123. Waning et al., supra note 122, at 166-68 (noting the dramatic fall in prices of
branded antiretroviral drugs, particularly as compared to generic antiretroviral drugs).
124. Canada's Access to Medicines Regime, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4, s. 21.03 & sched. 1.
Twenty-six of the drugs on the list are also listed in Canada's database of patented medicines,
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EML.'" In comparing the drugs used to treat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and
tuberculosis against the WHO Global Price Reporting Mechanism, a da-
tabase detailing reported prices paid for these drug combinations,126 one
finds that generic versions were sold in every case but one.127 In other
words, because a generic market already exists, there is no impetus for
Canadian intervention.
In the one instance where an export was actually arranged, between
Rwanda and the Canadian generic manufacturer, Apotex, cheaper ver-
sions of the drug were available on the open market.128 Looking back at
this case, there was literally no economic reason for Rwanda to request a
compulsory license from Canada.129 It is possible that various third par-
ties had political motivations for pushing Rwanda to move forward with
the license.O In any case, the fact that no license was requested subse-
quently from Canada (or any other country) by Rwanda (or any other
country) certainly suggests that CAMR is not a viable option for funding
drug dissemination.
Stated broadly, the mistake made with essential medicines was to
fundamentally misunderstand the least-developed country market and
the reasons for technology access barriers. The cost contribution of pat-
ent rights was overstated, and the utility of patent breaking mechanisms
oversold. In the end, direct financial and other developmental aid has
proven much more effective in addressing the ravages of disease in the
developing world.'
the Canadian version of the U.S. Orange Book. Canadian Patents Database, CANADIAN IN-
TELL. PROP. OFFICE, http://brevets-patents.ic.gc.calopic-cipo/cpdleng/introduction.htm (last
updated Jan. 19, 2011).
125. WHO, WHO Model List of Essential Medicines (16th ed. 2010), available at http://
www.who.intlentity/medicines/publications/essentialmedicines/Updated-sixteenth-adult-list_
en.pdf.
126. See Global Price Reporting Mechanism, WHO, http://apps.who.int/hiv/amds/
price/hdd/index.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2011) [hereinafter WHO-GPRM].
127. The one drug that had no reported generic equivalent sale was "amprenavir tablet,
150 mg; capsule, 50 mg or 150 mg; oral solution, 15 mg/mL." R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4, sched. 1.
This is likely because the branded manufacturer, GlaxoSmithKline, discontinued production
of the drug in 2007. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Amprenavir, AIDSinfo,
http://www.aidsinfo.nih.gov/DrugsNewlDrugDetailT.aspx?int-id=258 (last updated Apr. 30,
2010).
128. See CAMR REVIEW, supra note 47, at 34 ("[F]ive major Indian generic pharmaceu-
tical companies are listed on the Clinton Foundation Website as having lower-priced versions
of the same product available, . . . the lowest of which is roughly half the price specified by
Apotex in its application . . . ").
129. See Attaran, supra note 34, at 154.
130. See id. at 153 (describing the Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network's advocacy for
the use of CAMR in the context of the Rwanda license and generally); Morin & Gold, supra
note 57, at 22 (describing the reputational entrapment of NGOs).
131. See, e.g., Eran Bendavid & Jayanta Bhattacharya, The President's Plan for AIDS
Relief in Africa: An Evaluation of Outcomes, 150 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 688, 691
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However, a fair response to this point is that, although patent-
generated price gaps have not been important to date, they could become
so in the future. In the context of essential medicines, many commenta-
tors have noted that countries like India have instituted patent protection
over basic compounds.132 And other instances in which patents could
play a role, such as climate change, have not been tested. One might ar-
gue that patent breaking as a relief initiative could eventually prove its
worth. But here again, there are reasons why this may not be the case.
When faced with a compulsory license in a least-developed country
and the accompanying loss of market exclusivity, it is reasonable to as-
sume that innovator companies would take advantage of their production
efficiency and generally undercut generic efforts (see Figure 1). Only
where generic companies possess greater efficiencies in terms of labor
markets, access to materials, or combinations of separately patented
products' would a compulsorily licensed pharmaceutical be expected to
have the lowest price. This would be the case even if existing drug export
regimes were changed to remove restrictions; any advantage by devel-
oped countries would be mirrored by low-cost producers and matched by
branded companies.
As important, there is evidence that firms are seeing more opportuni-
ties in developing country markets.'3 This is particularly true for
pharmaceutical companies."3 It is not clear that developing countries will
completely erase losses due to expiring blockbuster drug sales in devel-
oped countries,3 6 but it is in these markets where the future revenue
focus lies. It is reasonable to presume that firms will only be more will-
ing to deliver essential goods to developing countries at moderate prices
in order to continue developing these emerging markets. This is yet an-
other factor obviating the need for compulsory licensing.
(2009) (finding that the U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief program was asso-
ciated with a decrease in deaths due to HIV/AIDS).
132. See, e.g., Brenda Waning et al, Intervening in Global Markets to Improve Access to
HIV/AIDS Treatment: An Analysis of International Policies and the Dynamics of Global Anti-
retroviral Medicines Markets, 6 GLOBALIZATION & HEALTH 1, 13 (2010) ("[I]ncreasing
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement in developing countries means that medicines pat-
ents are becoming more widespread [eliminating generic competition to reduce prices].").
133. See CIPIH Report, supra note 24, at 153, Box 5.4 (detailing the "Cost Advantages
of Indian Firms," including fixed asset costs, cheaper labor, chemistry or process costs, and
clinical study costs, as well as noting that such costs are estimated to be as little as one-eighth
of those confronted by developing country firms).
134. See Don Lee, A Rebalancing Act; U.S. Firms Sharpen Focus on Overseas Consum-
ers, CHI. TRIB, Oct. 6, 2009, at 19 (reporting on the increased focus on fast developing
countries for new profits).
135. Avery Johnson, Drug Firms See Poorer Nations as Sales Cure, WALL ST. J., July 7,
2009, at Al.
136. Hester Plumridge, Rising Nations Are No Remedy for Big Pharma, WALL ST. J.,
May 25, 2010, at C20.
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Still, significant pricing disparities can persist between branded and
generic goods, even in the absence of patents.'" Some countries pay sig-
nificantly higher costs for the same goods than other similarly situated
countries."' While this may be acceptable in middle-developed
countries--even necessary for a tiered pricing scheme" 9-if it occurs in
least-developed countries a genuine access issue is raised. In fact, it does
appear that companies may at times maintain high prices despite the
economic incentives to serve a lower priced market.'4 For a number of
reasons, including information asymmetry, specific business strategy,
and fear of losing control over product distribution, a company may
choose to maintain high prices and reduced access.14' However, the ex-
tent to which a company can engage in such behavior appears to be
much more limited currently, primarily as a result of NGO pressure.142
Companies are publicly derided for setting high prices, particularly when
making upward adjustments. Published sales information provides addi-
tional bargaining power to essential medicines purchasers and levels the
playing field.143 Finally, increased anticounterfeiting awareness has
placed greater emphasis on the authorized sale of medicines and meth-
ods to manage it.'" Although such measures can create problems for the
legitimate international transport of generic medicines,145 they also play a
role in ensuring that access-promoting price discrimination schemes can
function.'
137. See WHO Medicines Situation, supra note 25, at 69.
138. Id. ("Clearly, big price differences exist not only between generic and innovator
medicines, but also between prices for the same brand or generic in different countries.").
139. Prahant Yadav, Differential Pricing for Pharmaceuticals 9-16 (Study Conducted for
U.K. Dep't for Int'l Dev., 2010), available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/
publications l/prd/diff-pcing-pharma.pdf (reviewing the theory of differential or tiered pricing
and noting its access benefits given certain assumptions).
140. Abbott and Reichman provide some reasons as to why this condition could exist
temporarily. Abbott & Reichman, supra note 8, at 970-71.
141. Id.
142. See Kapczynski, supra note 50, at 828-29 (relating the strategies of the "access-to-
medicines" campaign and its perceived success in compelling pharmaceutical companies to
lower prices).
143. See, e.g., WHO-GPRM, supra note 126 (listing global prices of HIV/AIDS, tuber-
culosis, and malaria medications); Untangling the Web of Antiretroviral Price Reductions,
MDECINS SANs FRONTILREs, http://utw.msfaccess.org (last visited Feb. 25, 2011) (listing
global prices of antiretroviral drugs).
144. See Daniel R. Cahoy, Addressing the North-South Divide in Pharmaceutical Coun-
terfeiting, 8 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 407, 416-23 (2007) (detailing measures used to
combat counterfeiting and noting how such measures influence incentives).
145. See, e.g., Ho, supra note 7, at 1105-07 (describing the Dutch seizures of generic
drugs in transit under the mistaken impression that they were counterfeit).
146. The Paragraph 6 implementation provisions contain detailed requirements for
pharmaceutical marking, which maintains price discrimination schemes as well as limits coun-
terfeiting. Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 33, 2(b)(ii).
486 [Vol. 32:461
Yet another licensing rationale that has recently been forwarded is
that profit-motivated behavior may provide a barrier to lowering prices
in developing countries with great internal income disparities. In that
case, firms may choose to maintain high prices if they can render more
profit from the extremely wealthy than they can from more sales at low
prices to larger groups of impoverished citizens. Describing this phe-
nomenon as the "Convex Demand Curve Problem" in a fascinating
article on essential medicines, Flynn, Hollis, and Palmedo argue that it is
one of the more important reasons that high prices persist for patented
drugs.147 However, there are reasons that the curve may not entirely char-
acterize the economic environment underlying prospective compulsory
licenses. The analysis assumes uniform distribution of need, which may
be less true in the case of essential goods that are more in demand by the
poorer segments of society. And the comparison of medicine prices in
more uniform, high-income countries does not address the existence of
price controls or reference pricing schemes in those nations. But most
important is the fact that the Convex Demand Curve Problem will
probably only exist when a compulsory license has not been issued.
Once even the serious threat of such a license exists, the economic basis
for undesirably high prices disappears. While it is an interesting and im-
portant theory that should be integrated into the analysis, the Flynn et al.
framework may not describe many compulsory licensing situations in
established markets.
Finally, for those who consider developing country licensing for ex-
port to be the most likely source of future activity, the recent experiences
of India are instructive. Although India has traditionally housed a robust
generic drug industry fueled by a lack of composition patent protection,
the country adopted such protection in 2005'" to comply with TRIPS. 49
As a result, a small group of medicines have already been patented.50
Contemporaneously, India has enacted a Paragraph 6-influenced com-
pulsory license statute for the production of medicines for export."' To
date, no such license has been granted.'12 The generic pharmaceutical
147. Sean Flynn et al., An Economic Justification for Open Access to Essential Medicine
Patents in Developing Countries, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 184, 187-88 (2009).
148. The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005 (India).
149. TRIPS, supra note 29, art. 65, 14. See Kapczynski, supra note 20, at 1576-79.
150. See, e.g., Rupsa Gupta & Padmavati Manchikanti, Analysis of Patenting Trends of
Antifungal Drugs in the Product Patent Regime in India, 32 WORLD PAT. INFO. 135 (2009)
(describing product patent activity for antifungal drugs post-2005).
151. The Patents (Amendment) Act (India), § 55.
152. Ministry of Commerce & Indus., Dep't of Indust. Pol'y & Promotion, Discussion
Paper on Compulsory Licencing, at 3 (Aug. 24, 2010) (India) [hereinafter C.L.-Discussion
Paper], available at http://dipp.nic.in/CL-DraftDiscussion.doc.
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company, Natco Pharma, applied for a license in 2007'13 but was unable
to produce a request from an importing country."4 In addition, the Indian
Controller determined in the context of the application that patent own-
ers have a right to a hearing to dispute such licenses, complicating the
process. 5 Although one might presume that Natco's difficulties could be
overcome-indeed, reports at the beginning of 2011 state that the com-
pany will try again by applying for compulsory licenses on Pfizer's HIV
treatment, maraviroc,16 and Bayer's cancer treatment, sorafenib tosy-
late' 7-a 2010 report by the Indian Department of Industrial Policy and
Promotion'18 suggests that the climate for compulsory licenses in India
may be turning more hostile. The report notes that Indian generic compa-
nies are increasingly partnering or merging with foreign pharmaceutical
companies, reducing their incentive to compete through intellectual prop-
erty limitations. 59 Although the report advocates future compulsory
licensing, it suggests that reform efforts should focus on antitrust licensing
and price controls.'" All things considered, India does not appear poised to
make substantive humanitarian use of patent breaking any time soon. 6 1
Therefore, the first lesson to learn from compulsory licensing to-date
is that, in an established market where the demand is relatively clear and
predictable, true humanitarian compulsory licenses from least-developed
countries directed at developed country manufacturers will probably not
be used. Such mechanisms will tend to sit fallow because developing
countries will see no advantage in using them, particularly given the po-
tential for some foreign direct investment backlash. Even in the face of
the best intentions on the part of developed nations, with no requests,
there will be no licensing. After the emergence of patents in generic-
producing countries like India, there may be limited compulsory licens-
ing. But it will be countered by branded price cuts and authorized
licensing, and will be limited by its procedural complexities.
153. See id. at 16 & n.7; Swarup Kumar, Compulsory Licensing Provision Under TRIPS:
A Study of Roche vs Natco Case in India Vis-a-vis the Applicability of the Principle of Audi
Alteram Partem, 7 SCRIPTED 135, 141 (2010).
154. C.L.-Discussion Paper, supra note 152, at 16.
155. Kumar, supra note 153, at 141-43.
156. Rumman Ahmed, Natco Pharma Seeks "Compulsory License" for Copy of Pfizer
Drug, Dow JONES NEWSWIREs, Jan. 5, 2011 available at http://www.dowjones.de/site/2011/
01/natco-pharma-seeks-compulsory-license-for-copy-of-pfizer-drug.html.
157. Natco May Seek Compulsory License for Bayer Drug, AccoRD FINTECH (Mumbai),
Jan. 24,2011.
158. C.L.-Discussion Paper, supra note 152.
159. Id. at 8-9.
160. Id. at 10-11.
161. In addition to procedural complexities, Indian companies face economic and politi-
cal hurdles in licensing as well. Shamnad Basheer, India's New Patent Regime: Aiding
"Access" or Abetting "Genericide"?, 9 INT'L J. BIOTECH. 122, 131-33 (2007).
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Do compulsory licenses have any function in established markets?
Most certainly, in the form of pressure on patent owners to maintain
pricing that more closely conforms to Ramsey or tiered pricing ideals. 62
But that is a far cry from substituting for a country's foreign aid contri-
bution. The power to break patents is a check on the system, rather than
a future solution. And, as discussed below, there are many other in-
stances where breaking patents is useful. The lesson is as much about the
narrowness of the conclusions as it is about licensing ineffectiveness.
B. If Compulsory Licenses Provide Significant Advantages
over Bargaining, They Will Be Disruptive
What if the goal of a compulsory license is not simply to gain access
to important technology, but to use legal rules in order to obtain an ad-
vantage that would not be possible through bargaining? In some cases,
accessing a product or service on a reasonable basis is not the objective,
but rather the license is a means of simply getting lower prices. While a
country's efforts to spend less to provide basic and essential services to
its citizens is reasonable and laudable, economic disruption may occur if
this is achieved through the unexpected use and unpredictable applica-
tion of an ex post legal regime. 6 This is particularly true if the regime is
not available to all countries due to political and exogenous economic
pressure.
In general, a firm with patent rights will expect to negotiate prices
that will enable it to generate the most profit globally. It should be will-
ing to make concessions in lower-income countries so long as profits in
higher-income countries are sufficient.'6 Conversely, it will resist rock-
bottom pricing in larger, higher-income countries, even if there is a
public health use for the medicine. Still, negotiation can reduce infor-
mation asymmetries and provide a pricing structure that is mutually
acceptable for the firm and the purchasing entity. The predictable use
of a Ramsey-like, tiered pricing scheme becomes very important to
162. Ramsey pricing is price discrimination that yields the highest possible social wel-
fare subject to ensuring a target level of profit for the producer. See Patricia M. Danzon &
Adrian Towse, Theory and Implementation of Differential Pricing for Pharmaceuticals, in
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GoODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 431 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005).
See also Yadav, supra note 139, at 9-10 (describing Ramsey's work on pricing).
163. See, e.g., Fair, supra note 10, at 34-36 (arguing that, in the context of climate
change technology, compulsory licensing disrupts the profit flowing from intellectual property
that is necessary for long-term innovation and technology diffusion).
164. See Jerome Reichman, Comment, Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceuti-
cal Inventions: Evaluating the Options, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 247, 251 (2009) (describing
the conventional economic view as the "Realists' Perspective," but ultimately disagreeing that
it characterizes existing behavior).
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rolling out a global marketing strategy.'6 It is key to funding research
and development through overall firm profits. When the patent expires,
the firm can no longer depend on its ability to control pricing, so there
is a limited window for action. Most economists agree that the poten-
tial for obtaining a profit structure like this is the basis for maximally
funding innovation through a patent system'"-though alternative inno-
vation incentive systems might exist.'67
When the pricing scheme is circumvented by a legal mechanism that
discourages negotiation, this can be disruptive. Such discouragement can
occur if the legal mechanism simply permits a country to establish a
rock-bottom pricing scheme regardless of need. In this case, assuming
there is a ready manufacturer (particularly a domestic one), there is no
reason to negotiate with a firm seeking some level of monopoly pric-
ing.'68 The rational decision is to use the legal mechanism.
Certainly, opportunistic licensing can have the greatest effect on
predictable profits when it occurs in higher-income countries. For exam-
ple, if the United States were to engage in licensing as a budget lowering
initiative, the effect could be dramatic in fields such as pharmaceuticals
in which it is the primary world market.'69 Indeed, U.S. officials have
165. See Yadav, supra note 139, at 17-19 (describing the "drivers" to tiered pricing in
the pharmaceutical industry); see also Danzon & Towse, supra note 162, at 431.
166. See, e.g., Scherer & Watal, supra note 8, at 925-28, 933-34 (explaining the concept
of differentiated pricing or tiered pricing and how "it is necessary to recover a substantial
block of fixed costs (e.g. for research and development)"). But see Stiglitz, supra note 21, at
1706-09 (describing why patent incentives may not produce benefits exceeding costs).
167. Many argue that a patent system is suboptimal in certain contexts. See Ho, supra
note 81, at 453-57 (arguing no single system is likely to be ideal for all types of innovation);
Love & Hubbard, supra note 52, at 162 (arguing that price and innovation incentives should
be delinked using an alternative to the patent system).
168. Although there is some disagreement, it has been alleged that Thailand did not
negotiate with pharmaceutical companies before imposing several compulsory licenses in
2006 and 2007. Lybecker & Fowler, supra note 35, at 228-29. Some have described the cir-
cumstances as opportunistic. Id. at 229 (noting that the Thai government pharmaceutical
company which operated under the compulsory license is increasingly viewed as a profitable
player). The same allegation has been leveled against Brazil. See Lawrence A. Kogan, Brazil's
IP Opportunism Threatens U.S. Private Property Rights, 38 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 1,
98-102 (2006) (arguing that Brazil issues compulsory licenses to gain trade advantages and
engage in protectionism).
169. According to IMS Health, the total global pharmaceutical market was $808 bil-
lion in 2009. Total Unaudited and Audited Global Pharmaceutical Market, IMS HEALTH
(Mar. 2010), http://www.imshealth.com/deployedfiles/imshealth/Global/Content/StaticFile/
Top-LineData/Global%20Pharmaceutical%2OMarket2009.pdf. Of that, the United States
alone accounted for $300.3 billion in prescription sales, representing a full 37% of the




occasionally voiced an interest in such opportunism.o But, such a use of
intellectual property is considered analogous to a taking,"' and compen-
sation is generally provided at a market rate."' As such, there is literally
no advantage to licensing. The same is true of any country that views
patent compulsory licensing as a property "expropriation," requiring
market-based compensation."'
The more pressing problem is the middle-income country that guar-
antees no such protection for intellectual property compensation. For
example, when countries such as Thailand, Brazil, or even Ecuador li-
cense patents at a rate that has no connection to market expectations, any
profits from those countries that were figured into a global marketing
scheme involving multiple products are impacted.'1 4 In some cases, in-
ternational pressure, particularly the loss of foreign direct investment,
will dissuade such disruptive policies. '7  But some countries are rela-
tively immune from such pressures due to their size and lack of
dependence on foreign investment.'76 They can engage in opportunistic
licensing as a reasonable alternative to bargaining without suffering eco-
nomic effects.
170. See Cahoy, supra note 94, at 127 (describing the threats from U.S. officials to com-
pulsorily license ciprofloxacin in response to the Anthrax attacks).
171. See Boeing Co. v. United States, 86 Fed. Cl. 303, 310 (2009) ("[T]he waiver of
sovereign immunity in section 1498(a) differs from those provisions in that it does not sound
in tort, but rather authorizes an action analogous to one for a non-exclusive taking of a license
under the Fifth Amendment."). But see Adam Mossoff, How the "New GM" Can Steal from
Toyota, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 399, 402-04 (2010) (explaining that there is a gap in compensation
provided by § 1498 such that some claims that would be actionable in a private patent lawsuit
cannot be brought against the federal government).
172. Boeing, 86 Fed. Cl. at 310 (noting patentee can recover "reasonable and entire"
compensation from the United States); Richard J. McNeely, Comment, Governmental Indirect
Patent Infringement: The Need to Hold Uncle Sam Accountable Under 28 U.S.C. § 1498, 36
CAP. U. L. REV. 1065, 1081 (2008) (explaining that lost profits as well as royalties are in-
cluded in possible damages calculations).
173. Many Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) require fair or market compensation for
expropriations of property. Antony Taubman, Rethinking TRIPS: "Adequate Remuneration"
for Non-Voluntary Patent Licensing, 11 J. INT'L ECON. L. 927, 963-64 (2008). But there is
some ambiguity as to whether compulsory licenses could be considered expropriations,
though some mechanisms explicitly exclude TRIPS-compliant licenses. Id. See also Carlos M.
Correa, Investment Protection in Bilateral and Free Trade Agreements: Implications for the
Granting of Compulsory Licenses, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 331, 348-51 (2004). The WTO has
not yet addressed the issue.
174. See Cahoy, supra note 8, at 166 (describing the impact of reduced profits on a
global pharmaceutical innovation program). But see Flynn et al., supra note 147, at 192 (argu-
ing that in many developing countries, patent incentives do not provide substantial motivation
for innovation so lost profits are irrelevant).
175. For an excellent review of many of the pressures faced by licensing countries, see
Reichman, supra note 164, at 256-59.
176. See, e.g., Bird & Cahoy, supra note 91, at 309-17 (describing Brazil's resistance to
foreign direct investment retribution).
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Perhaps the more insidious effect of this disruption is that it may
have negative externalities for countries with less power. A firm that has
had its Ramsey pricing scheme scuttled may attempt to increase prices in
countries that have less recourse. Rather than a punishment of patent-
owning monopolists, opportunistic licensing can devolve into a source of
division between the powerful and the powerless, creating inequity and
even decreasing access in some areas.
Equally as bad, firms may respond by changing marketing strategy
to limit exposure of future patented technology in countries where it may
be exploited. Although patents represent public information, there are
often secret aspects of a product's manufacture that would hinder copy-
ing.'" Even in the context of the relatively open drug approval process,
these secrets may be disclosed in an application, but the contents are
generally not public in their entirety. '7 A foreshadowing of this possibil-
ity can be seen in the recent actions of Thailand and the pharmaceutical
company, Abbott Labs. When Thailand issued a compulsory license for a
patented drug Abbott sells under the name Kaletra, the company re-
sponded by refusing to register new medicines in the country.7 One of
the medicines held back was a version of Kaletra (called Aluvia) which
was heat-stable, a characteristic that is extremely important in tropical
environments like Thailand.8 o If Abbott had maintained its position,''
lives may have been unnecessarily lost due to this patent-inspired brink-
manship. Although Abbott's move may have been more of punishment
than an act to prevent copying, the same policy could be implemented to
control information.
C. A Lack of Predictable Structure Delays Emergency Response
Despite the fact that imposing a compulsory license may be an ex-
tremely important mechanism for managing a crisis, it does not appear to
be central in the planning of developed nations. Even in developing na-
177. See, e.g., Abbott & Reichman, supra note 8, at 979-80 (remarking on the difficul-
ties in reverse engineering some drugs and suggesting that some companies may count on that
in setting their prices high).
178. For example, even after a drug is approved, much of the important information
about how to manufacture and formulate a drug-information not in a compound patent-
remains secret. 21 C.F.R. §§ 20.61, 314.430, 601.51 (2009); DONALD 0. BEERS, GENERIC AND
INNOVATOR DRUGs: A GUIDE To FDA APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS § 5.01 (5th ed. 1999).
179. Ho, supra note 81, at 443-47.
180. Id.
181. Abbott relented and eventually agreed to sell Aluvia in Thailand. Press Release,
AIDS Healthcare Foundation, AIDS Healthcare Foundation Says CaIPERS to Question Abbott





tions, one rarely sees compulsory licenses discussed outside of the con-
text of essential medicines. There are at least two related reasons for this
lack of consideration for compulsory licenses: (1) it is difficult to predict
how these licenses should be addressed from a legal and financial stand-
point, and (2) there is a perception that they are somehow illegitimate,
particularly in a country with a strong system of support for property
rights.132
The ambiguity surrounding compulsory licensing goes to the core of
its purpose, as exemplified by the phrase "breaking patents." In fact,
such licenses do not actually break patents but merely relax them in a
very limited context, and then only temporarily.' But when the patents
can be relaxed, to what extent, and what the obligations should be on the
licensing country are less than clear.
A review of the TRIPS agreement is useful in demonstrating that the
power to issue compulsory licenses is actually quite broad.'1" TRIPS
does not limit such licensing to emergencies, it does not require an initial
negotiation (so long as the use is not commercial), and it is certainly not
limited to medicines or other essential goods.8 The Paragraph 6 provi-
sion for increasing access to medicines is more limited in that it
specifically applies to pharmaceuticals and provides some advantages for
least-developed countries."6 But even here, specific disease conditions
are not addressed and the procedure is still relatively undefined.'
Perhaps the most critical ambiguity is an economic flexibility that
exists in both the general TRIPS agreement and the Paragraph 6 revi-
sions. Namely, neither defines compensation. TRIPS merely states that
compulsory licenses should provide "adequate remuneration . .. taking
into account the economic value of the authorization.""8 In practice, this
has ranged as low as the 0.5% royalty imposed by Thailand" (or even
182. As noted earlier, the United States mentioned Ecuador's compulsory license in its
Special 301 Report. 2010 SPECIAL 301, supra note 84, at 31. And when Thailand imposed its
licenses, which were clearly within TRIPS legalities, Merck stated, "expropriation of intellec-
tual property sends a chilling signal to research-based companies." Ho, supra note 81, at 451.
183. The TRIPS agreement requires that "the scope and duration of [the license] be
limited to the purpose for which it was authorized." TRIPS, supra note 29, art. 31(c).
184. Depending on the form of an emergency and the nature of the government response,
the value of a patent could arguably be reduced to almost zero in certain circumstances. See
Dennis D. Crouch, Nil: The Value of Patents in a Major Crisis Such as an Influenza Pandemic,
39 SETON HALL L. REv. 1125, 1127-32 (2009) (arguing, for example, that infringement by
U.S. states may be immune from challenge in U.S. courts).
185. TRIPS, supra note 29, art. 31.
186. Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 33, I 2, 6.
187. Id.
188. TRIPS, supra note 29, art. 31(h).
189. Thail. Efavirenz C.L., supra note 68. Professor Reichman argues that Thailand
would have been willing to renegotiate the royalty, though it is unclear what the motivation for
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zero if you count licenses imposed as antitrust remedies).'" Graduated
compensation scales have been proposed'91 and even incorporated into
national laws like CAMR,'' but these are only recommendations. At the
very least, most presume that compulsory licenses will represent a dis-
count from the market rate, but there is no guarantee as to how much
profit will be reduced.
Compulsory licenses can be politically problematic, in part due to
their ambiguous nature and ad hoc rules. The United States has placed
countries on its well-known Special 301 list when they have engaged in
compulsory licensing without negotiation'" (despite the fact that the U.S.
essentially engages in such behavior itself).'9 Such a license is viewed
by some as a measure of disrespect for intellectual property rights.'95 The
ultimate issue of compensation probably underlies the generally negative
attitude toward breaking patents among industrialized nations. In some
contexts, like access to essential medicines, there is a general perception
that compulsory licenses must represent a discount from the market price
of the licensed good.'96
But it does not follow that compulsory licenses are always disrup-
tive. In fact, they are not always controversial. Handled the right way,
with compensation guarantees in particular, they can fit within the
broader goals of the intellectual property system, encouraging fair and
intelligent pricing, and supporting access. One might even argue that
there is a shadow context for compulsory licensing that takes place rela-
tively often, even in developed countries, and raises no hackles. The
doing so would have been given the unilateral nature of compulsory licensing. Reichman,
supra note 164, at 256. Still, he concedes that it was a "low royalty." Id.
190. Makan Delrahim, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Forcing Firms
to Share the Sandbox: Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property Rights and Antitrust
(May 10, 2004) (transcript available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/203627.htm)
(noting that compulsory licenses can be issued without royalties attached).
191. See, e.g., James Love, Remuneration Guidelines for Non-Voluntary Use of a Patent
on Medical Technologies, WHO Health Economics and Drugs TCM Series No. 18, WHO
Doc. WHOITCM/2005.1 (2005), available at http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/technical
cooperation/WHOTCM2005. LOMS.pdf
192. Canada's Access to Medicine Regime: Royalty Payment, Gov'T OF CAN.,
http://www.camr-rcam.gc.ca/compan-entrepris/applic-demande/royal-pay-verseredev_e.html
(last updated July 28, 2006) [hereinafter Canada Royalty Guidelines]
193. See Kapczynski, supra note 20, at 1630 (stating that the threat to compulsorily
license patents was a reason that South Africa ended up on the Special 301 list in 1998, and
that Thailand was similarly added in 1999 and again in 2007).
194. See UNCTAD-ICTSD RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 7, at 468 (noting common U.S.
practice of issuing compulsory licenses without notification).
195. See, e.g., Andrew Jack & Amy Kazmin, Abbott Pulls HIV Drug in Thai Patents
Protest, FIN. TIMEs, Mar. 14, 2007, at 5 (reporting on Abbott Labs' criticism of Thailand for its
"disrespect for western companies' intellectual property").
196. Cahoy, supra note 8, at 155-62 (referring to the fact that compulsory licenses must
represent a discount from market compensation as a legal myth).
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United States in its dealings with Boeing provides a clear example.
When it authorizes one company, like Lockheed Martin, to use another
company's patent rights, like Boeing's, it ensures that the license will
have little market effect. The U.S. government compensates for its own
after-the-fact "infringement" of patents through a federal intellectual
property takings statute." It provides market-based compensation, and
therefore creates no disruption in the U.S. marketplace.'" This is not
viewed as illegitimate or immoral. Other countries engage in similar ac-
tions.
Regardless of the apparent workability under the right conditions,
the politics and uncertainty of breaking patents prevent most nations
from integrating it into an emergency plan. This shortsightedness creates
a danger that a bureaucratic hurdle will prevent a nation from acting as
quickly as it otherwise could. The fact that few such instances have oc-
curred in the past may blind policymakers as to the need for compulsory
licensing in emergency plans. But the industry's greater dependence on
intellectual property as a core asset'" suggests that the need is more im-
portant now than ever, and it will continue to grow.
The knowledge that access to life-saving goods, if necessary, could
be obtained through a defined process would be very helpful in navigat-
ing uncharted waters. Consider the fact that this kind of planning is quite
common in the context of real property. When governments have a need
to obtain large amounts of land to support public projects like highways
and stadiums, eminent domain is retained as an option.m And it is gener-
ally not considered to be economically disruptive (though it can still be
politically contentious).20' Conversely, the inability to consider such a
notion paralyzes an aspect of emergency response and imperils the wel-
fare of nations.
197. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2006); see also Boeing Co. v. United States, 86 Fed. Cl. 303, 310
(2009) (characterizing § 1498).
198. See McNeely, supra note 172, at 1081; see also Cahoy, supra note 94, at 163-71
(providing rationale for market compensation).
199. See Margo Reder, CEO Postings-Leveraging the Internet's Communications Po-
tential While Managing the Message to Maintain Corporate Governance Interests in
Information Security, Reputation and Compliance, 7 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 179, 190
(2009) (value of IP intellectual property accounts for two-thirds of the value of U.S. compa-
nies).
200. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE URBAN DEV. CORP., EMPIRE STATE DEv. CORP., ATLANTIC
YARDS LAND USE IMPROVEMENT AND CIVIC PROJECT MODIFIED GENERAL PROJECT PLAN 22,
23, 30 (2009), available at http://www.empire.state.ny.us/Subsidiaries_]Projects/Data/
AtlanticYards/ModifiedGPP2009.pdf (describing the retained option of using eminent domain
power if necessary to acquire land for the Atlantic Yards development project in New York
City).
201. See, e.g., Julia Vitullo-Martin, Columbia Gets a Lesson in Property Rights, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 2, 2010, at A9 (reporting on the political and legal fight surrounding Columbia
University's planned expansion onto supposedly "blighted" private land).
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III. A WAY FORWARD THROUGH Ex POST BALANCING OF
STAKEHOLDER INTERESTS
For patent breaking to continue to exist as a viable strategy, sup-
ported by both developed and developing nations, and accepted by both
industry and activists, the three stories presented above must be coher-
ently resolved. There must be a single system that can address all of the
instances in which compulsory licensing is necessary. And yet, that sys-
tem must be structured such that it does not primarily provide a tool for
those with sufficient power to thwart the market. This is a goal that has
been present since compulsory licensing was first fully articulated, but
the ascendance of developing nations and the existence of a truly global
economy provide perspective that has not existed in the past. This new
knowledge and experience should be integrated into a regime that pre-
serves compulsory licensing as a respected and dependable legal tool.
One of the barriers to reform has always been that compulsory li-
cense rules are viewed as an attempt to create compromise between the
allegedly diametrically opposed forces of innovation and access.202 How-
ever, using the right structure, one might be able to provide a mechanism
that is supported by all sides. If the incentives and dispute resolution sys-
tem were properly aligned to global patent breaking goals, one can
imagine that parties could participate in ways they deem unacceptable
now. In some cases, activists would discourage compulsory licenses as
counterproductive, and in others, industry would favor the use of such
licenses.
Importantly, an international solution is key. Although it is possible
for national or regional legislation to ameliorate some of these issues, the
trend toward harmonization limits the legal space for local problem solv-
ing. The fact is that international intellectual property rules are becoming
more important in setting standards. In addition, it is equally important
that the solution be simple and fit within the existing structure. The like-
lihood that TRIPS would be renegotiated in any substantial way in the
near future is very small.
However, a rather simple modification of the compulsory license
remuneration mechanism may provide a solution.203 As discussed below,
an interpretive tweak could heal the existing rift significantly. Thank-
fully, the time is ripe for reform. Reformers can seize on international
202. See Kapczynski, supra note 50, at 827-36 (describing the confrontational tactics of
the "access to knowledge" movement); Morin & Gold, supra note 57, at 14-16 (suggesting
that NGOs and pharmaceutical companies argued to reach a consensus without trust in one
another).
203. TRIPS, supra note 29, art. 3 1(h).
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interest in the Paragraph 6 mechanism as an opportunity to consider
overall reform for a more equitable and predictable regime.
A. Bringing All the Parties to the Table: Licensing vs. Breaking
An important aspect of compulsory license reform is to reimagine
the mechanism as something that is positive for all sides. Traditionally,
industry has viewed compulsory licensing as a rights exception and
therefore something to be opposed at every turn.2 Conversely, activists
are skeptical that an attenuation of compulsory license rules will result in
a windfall for industry, particularly in areas where profits are perceived
to be unjustifiably high.2' If there were some way to bring all parties to
the table as participants in a system with mutual benefits, it would be a
great improvement.
The problem with current practice is that it treats planned compul-
sory licensing as an ex ante exception to rights. Such a royalty discount
is assumed, untethered to any actual market condition, and patent owners
consider the payment to be a token at best.206 This is clearly illustrated by
the emergence of the phrase used throughout this paper and in the popu-
lar media: to "break patents." 207 But perhaps there is another way to
envision the unauthorized use of patents. A system where patent owners
can expect a reasonable return may encourage them to realign the private
market. And with patent owner participation, consuming countries can
make use without fear of stigma or punishment. Such a system would
likely be more limited in its boundaries than TRIPS is currently. It may
not be useful in all of the contexts for which compulsory licensing has
been imagined in the past. But as described above, in the most critical
aspects like emergencies, it will serve its function of permitting access.
204. Janice Mueller, Public Access Versus Proprietary Rights in Genomic Information:
What Is the Proper Role of Intellectual Property Rights?, 6 J. HEALTH CARE L. & Pot'Y 222,
232 n.67 (2003) (listing sources dating back to the 1950s that describe industry resistance to
general compulsory licensing).
205. Nevin M. Gewertz & Rivka Amado, Intellectual Property and the Pharmaceutical
Industry: A Moral Crossroads Between Health and Property, 55 J. Bus. ETHIcs 295, 298
(2004) (discussing the moral and ethical issues involved in a patent's ability to provide a
"windfall" to its owner).
206. For example, Canada's former pharmaceutical compulsory license system, which
was abandoned in 1987, arbitrarily applied a 4% royalty almost uniformly following an Ex-
chequer Court decision involving Hoffman-LaRoche's Valium. Scherer & Watal, supra note 8,
at 924. The current Canadian regime incorporates a 4% royalty as a ceiling because this "is
consistent with the humanitarian and non-commercial considerations that are the foundation
of the Regime." Canada Royalty Guidelines, supra note 192. There is no pretense that the rate
reflects real-world licensing rates for any of the scheduled pharmaceuticals.
207. See, e.g., Abbott in Thailand, CHI. TRIB., May 10, 2007, at 26 (referring to Thai-
land's "threat to break patents").
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The idea of bringing patent owners into the system is not radical or
new. Many commentators that have considered the legal regimes associ-
ated with the Paragraph 6 amendments suggest they are a fair
realignment of property rules that permit all sides to come out ahead.208
However, the execution of this goal has been poor. It is apparent that the
negotiation of such legal regimes, at least in the patent context, has gen-
erally occurred without the enthusiastic participation of industry.2 9 In
some cases, where industry actually did participate, it could be argued
that it was motivated primarily by public relations concerns. 2'0 Regard-
less, the participation of industry has not been helpful in finding a way
forward to-date.
Outside of Paragraph 6 licensing, the extent to which industry is a
participant or is given respect depends on the country. In many devel-
oped countries, the interests of industry are accounted for in the same
way that general property rights are. 2" But in some developing countries,
there is a lack of this level of accounting. The difference may be more
related to whether the affected industry has investment interests in the
licensing country, rather than a deep ideological split on how to account
for licensing.
Intriguingly, U.S. copyright law provides a useful model for equita-
ble patent licensing. Since the early part of the 20th century, U.S. law
has provided for a compulsory license-referred to as a "mechanical
license"212-for the subsequent recording of musical works that have
been distributed to the public on phonorecords. 2 3 Most people refer to
the copies as "cover songs."214 The system has been widely criticized as
208. See, e.g., Flynn et al., supra note 147, at 191 ("Converting the property rule to a
liability rule through a compulsory license allows a country to change most of the deadweight
loss into consumer surplus . .. while providing a measured contribution to research and devel-
opment expenses through a royalty payment.").
209.' In many cases, industry stakeholders have their own solutions in mind and are re-
luctant to cede control to NGOs or developing country governments. See Gold & Morin, supra
note 56, at 1330 ("NGOs and industry need to work together to achieve success.").
210. Morin & Gold, supra note 57, at 21-22 ("[I]ndustry representatives described de-
bates on access to medicines as a 'political exercise,' a 'symbolic issue,' the 'easiest
scapegoat,' a 'media-visible solution,' or a 'total political process."').
211. See Laurence R. Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property and
the European Court of Human Rights, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 32-34 (2008) (describing the
European Commission's consideration of a compulsory license under the rubric of the human
right to property in Smith Kline & French Labs, Ltd. v. Netherlands, App. No. 12633/87, 66
Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 70, 72-73 (1990)).
212. Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REv. 1293, 1309 (1996).
213. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006). The copyright act actually has other compulsory license
sections, including secondary transmission for cable television. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2006).
214. E.g., John Baldrica, Cover Songs and Donkey Kong: The Rationale Behind Com-
pulsory Licensing of Musical Composition Can Inform a Fairer Treatment of User-Modified
Videogames, 11 N.C. J.L. & Tcti. 103, 104-05 (2009).
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unwieldy215 and argued to be an inappropriate conversion of a property
116
regime to a liability-focused one. But there are some positive lessons
to be learned. First, the system ensures that the rights are available for
use without the problem of holdouts.2 17 Further, the existence of a de-
fined licensing fee has enabled private negotiation to exist
concurrently." The U.S. copyright office, in consultation with interested
parties, determines the fee.219 It is actually a functional system in many
respects.
Most importantly, due to the existence of copyright compulsory li-
censes, there are very likely some cases in which a copyright owner has
increased its profit because its music is being used, and obtained royal-
ties that it would otherwise not have without the licenses. In other words,
it is almost certain that, due to the mechanical license provisions, some
copyright owners increase their profits.
The greatest problem with the copyright mechanical licensing sys-
tem is that it is a blunt instrument that does not take into account when a
private market would be superior.2 20 A license with a moderate, govern-
ment-determined royalty exists in all cases, regardless of whether the
owner of the work would be a rational negotiator and easily identifiable.
Folding just a few of these notions into the TRIPS patent rules might be
a path toward a more reliable system. But a wholesale adoption would
215. See Jeffrey A. Wakolbinger, Compositions Are Being Sold for a Song: Proposed
Legislation and New Licensing Opportunities Demonstrate the Unfairness of Compulsory
Licensing to Owners of Musical Compositions, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 803, 815-16 (2008) (not-
ing composer and publisher complaints about unnecessary middlemen for licensing).
216. See Merges, supra note 212, at 1308-12 (1996) (arguing that the liability rules
related to copyright compulsory licensing are clearly suboptimal, pointing to the market dis-
tortion effect of the rarely revised royalty rate).
217. This was apparently the primary motivation behind the statute. See id. at 1308-09.
In the patent context, there have been theoretical arguments as to how compulsory licensing
could lead to greater efficiencies for all parties when holdouts exist. See, e.g., Donna M. Git-
ter, International Conflicts over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the United States and
the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Exception, 76
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 1679-84 (2001).
218. Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 TEx. L. REV. 253, 295-96 (2009)
("[C]ompulsory licenses have been subject to bargaining in the shadow of copyright royalty
judges.").
219. Id. at 262-63 (describing the work of the Copyright Royalty Board in setting rates).
A list of participants in recent license rate determinations demonstrates the substantial partici-
pation of publishers, composers, and distributors. Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord
Delivery Rate Determination Proceeding, 73 Fed. Reg. 57033, 57033 (proposed Oct. 1, 2008)
(codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 385).
220. See, e.g., Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W.
RES. L. REv 673, 709-11 (2003) (describing, in the context of sound recordings, how the
copyright mechanical license constrains private bargaining that might otherwise occur); Mark
A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85
TEx. L. REv. 783, 831-33 (2007) (arguing that the copyright mechanical license permits pri-
vate bargaining, but it often works in the shadow of an imperfect royalty system).
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never be a realistic possibility, either in terms of efficiency or political
viability.
The trick seems to be to subtly modify the system to provide stabil-
ity and reliability for property owners as well as reasonable access for
those who need the invention. Ideally, such modifications would apply to
any license of patented technology, whether related to pharmaceuticals
or computer chips. And the rules would ideally be simple and stream-
lined so as not to deter their use through complexity or bureaucracy.
Surprisingly, all of this could be accomplished with a relatively sim-
ple revision of TRIPS. One would focus on the interpretation of the
remuneration aspects and incorporate a normative analytical framework
that may not be formally accepted by all TRIPS members, but has seem-
ingly provided the guiding principles for operations to date. The TRIPS
council should consider this revision within a human rights framework
while working to simplify the qualification rules as the council moves
forward.
B. The Utility of a Human Rights Framework in
Categorizing and Valuing Interests
Given that the primary issue in compulsory licensing is income, it
makes sense to focus on the royalty aspects of TRIPS. This provides a
great deal of flexibility. The section of TRIPS addressing remuneration
is set forth in very vague terms, which means that a modification could
be layered on top. No formal system need be disassembled, and no real
expectations exist that must be revised.
TRIPS Articles 31 and 3 Ibis both require only that remuneration be
"adequate."22' In addition, TRIPS requires that the remuneration be open
222
to challenge within the licensing country. Theoretically, one could
bring a dispute before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body on the amount
of remuneration,223 but so far, no country has.24 Truthfully, using the cur-
rent rules, it would be hard to imagine how one would clearly establish
that any remuneration amount above zero is not adequate, particularly
221. TRIPS, supra note 29, arts. 3 1(h), 31bis(2); Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 33,
1 3 (referring back to TRIPS art. 31(h)).
222. TRIPS, supra note 29, art. 31(j). Since the Paragraph 6 decision incorporates the
remuneration provisions of TRIPS, one assumes that the appeal process is also included,
though it is not explicitly referenced. See Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 33.
223. See Taubman, supra note 173, at 941-43 (outlining how a dispute on compulsory
license remuneration would proceed through the WTO Dispute Settlement Body).
224. Of the twenty-nine cases that have been brought to date, none concern a dispute
over a country's use of TRIPS art. 31. Disputes by Agreement: Intellectual Property (TRIPS),
WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-je/dispu-agreements-index e.htm?id=A26#
selected-agreement (last visited Jan. 10, 2011).
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when the market remains intact across the rest of the globe.22 Does
"adequate" mean sufficient to cover lost sales, production, or research
and development costs, or is it simply a rule-of-thumb amount that has
been allocated in other contexts? TRIPS is silent on this account. More-
over, although the negotiation history reveals that there were many
perspectives put forward during the negotiation of the final language,226
the participants' intent on the final meaning is still open to question.
However, this silence provides an opportunity. The incorporation of
some means of determining when remuneration is adequate would solve
the inconsistencies noted above. It could distinguish between a circum-
stance in which there is no access in an emergency from one in which a
country engages in purely opportunistic licensing. Moreover, the in-
volvement of the dispute resolution panel would ensure some degree of
objectivity. On the other hand, it seems obvious that the licensing coun-
try would have a bias in determining whether the licensing rate is too
low (it would be like having an arbitration system run entirely by a com-
227
pany at the center of a dispute), yet that is the system as it currently
exists.
Of course, stating that a dispute body should be able to settle on rea-
sonable royalty rates in necessary circumstances, and actually
identifying those rates are different things. Climate change technology
does not have the fungible properties of popular music that naturally
lends itself to a government royalty setting. Drugs may have dramati-
cally different therapeutic efficacies, production costs, and global price
support. The same is certainly true for other inventions that do not lend
themselves to a clear valuation. A royalty rate that might be fair for one
might not be appropriate for another. But that does not necessarily mean
that the process is completely without boundaries. Rather there are gen-
eral principles that could be used to ground a royalty process.
A human rights assessment could provide some indication of when a
less-than-market royalty payment is necessary. Although human rights
obligations are not accepted by every nation-notably, the United States
has refused to ratify what could be considered the most important treaty
relating to cultural and social rights22 -there is more agreement here
225. See Taubman, supra note 173, at 951-57 (addressing various arguments that would
be considered in determining whether a royalty rate is adequate and noting that it is not equiv-
alent to full compensation in all cases).
226. See UNCTAD-ICTSD RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 7, at 463-67.
227. See id.; Taubman, supra note 173, at 952-53.
228. International Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. The United States signed the treaty in 1977, but has never
ratified it. See Status of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/pagesNiewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&
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than meets the eye. The fundamental principles of human rights seem to
underlie almost every nation's pronouncements regarding access to in-
ventions, and all nations actually do accept some obligations. 229 The
disagreement appears to be on when human rights are truly at stake and
230
what mechanisms are necessary to "respect, protect and fulfill" them.
Still, given the absence of any measuring norm in the current regime, it
seems likely that most nations would agree to a human rights analysis as
a set of balancing principles if such an analysis were complete enough to
consider all interests. In cases where there is a deep objection to the lan-
guage of human rights, an argument that the relevant principles are part
of customary international law may carry some weight.23'
The first step in the process would be to determine what human
rights are implicated in a given compulsory licensing decision. Where
patented inventions are concerned, the right to health is a primary candi-
date for remuneration consideration. According to Article 25 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), "[e]veryone has the
right to a standard of living adequate for the health of himself and of his
family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary
social service." 232 That basic broad principle was ratified by many of the
developed country members of the TRIPS agreement, including the
United States.233 However, it is not binding and is reasonably subject to
234interpretation. More specific is the International Convention on Eco-
mtdsg-no=IV-3&chapter=4&lang=en (last updated Jan. 19, 2011) [hereinafter ICESCR Sta-
tus].
229. Even though the United States has resisted the notion of the right to health as it has
been expressed in major treaties, it has shown support for aspects of such a right in its support
of resolutions on international health care and trade policies. HESTERMEYER, supra note 27, at
131.
230. Elizabeth M. Bruch, Whose Law Is It Anyway? The Cultural Legitimacy of Interna-
tional Human Rights in the United States, 73 TENN. L. REV. 669, 687-90 (2006) (noting that
current debates in the U.S. about human rights relate to the cultural legitimacy of the stan-
dards). Guidance for parties to ICESCR on the right to health is provided by a document
known as General Comment 14, a binding interpretation of the covenant. U.N. Econ. & Soc.
Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, 1 33, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11,
2000) [hereinafter CESCR Comment 14].
231. See HESTERMEYER, supra note 27, at 122-23 (discussing the application of custom-
ary international law).
232. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) art. 25, G.A. Res. 217 (IH) A,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(l) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
233. The United States not only ratified the UDHR, but also was actually one of the
primary drafters of the document. Scott L. Cummings & Louise G. Trubek, Globalizing Pub-
lic Interest Law, 13 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1, 12 (2008).
234. See Mac Darrow & Louise Arbour, The Pillar of Glass: Human Rights in the De-
velopment Operations of the United Nations, 103 Am. J. INT'L L. 446, 469-70 (2009) (stating
that the UDHR is not binding, but that substantial parts likely now qualify as customary inter-
national law).
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nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which acknowledges "the
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health.",3 ' This agreement has binding obligations but
a more limited list of ratifying countries, with the most important holdout
being the United States.236 Regardless, the ICESCR has been subject to
detailed interpretation in the context of compulsory licensing. According
to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in its Com-
ment 14 issued in 2000, the right to health does not mean that states
parties are obligated to provide full health care services, such as instituting
a national insurance system.237 Rather, the Committee annunciated several
"core" obligations that included access to essential medicines, food, basic
shelter, sanitation, and safe, potable water."" As a starting point, a remu-
neration regime that stands as a barrier to these core obligations by
making them economically unobtainable is problematic.
A counterweight to the human right to health is, to some extent, the
right to profit from one's invention. This right is often ignored or at
least highly subjugated to other human rights. According to UDHR Ar-
ticle 27, "[e]veryone has the right to the protection of the moral and
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic pro-
duction of which he is the author."23 9 Again, this is reflected in ICESCR
Article 15, which describes the "right of everyone .. . [t]o benefit from
the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any sci-
entific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author."o This
seemingly strong statement has been tamped down by the Committee,
which noted that the human right to benefit from intellectual property is
not coextensive with the legal right set forth in intellectual property
laws. 24' Rather, the human right is tied into a personal interest.242 This is
similar to the natural rights or Lockean perspective on intellectual prop-
erty prevalent in earlier common law jurisprudence and scholarship.24'
235. ICESCR, supra note 228.
236. See ICESCR Status, supra note 228 (listing all ICESCR signatures and ratifica-
tions).
237. CESCR Comment 14, supra note 230, 36 (stating a number of mechanisms for
providing health care, including private insurance).
238. Id. 143.
239. UDHR, supra note 232, art. 27(2).
240. ICESCR, supra note 228, art. 15(1).
241. ECOSOC, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment 17, The
Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting
from Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He or She Is the Author, 11 2-3,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12, 2006) [hereinafter CESCR Comment 17).
242. Id. 12.
243. See Adam Mossoff, The Use and Abuse of IP at the Birth of the Administrative
State, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2022-44 (2009) (relating John Locke's labor theory of prop-
erty as applied to intellectual property).
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One aspect this perspective makes clear is the necessity for alienation of
the property-as opposed the human right-which necessarily feeds into
the adequate remuneration issue." The ability to be fairly compensated
for a scientific production is strongly connected to its alienability. 45 In
addition to ICESCR rights for intellectual property specifically, there is a
right to property accepted in non-binding human rights documents like
the UDHRw and the Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man.
These could be informative in providing some interpretative context to a
compulsory licensing remuneration valuation.
FIGURE 2









244. CESCR Comment 17, supra note 241, 14 (noting the economic dimension of the
right).
245. See id. 1 31 ("States parties must ensure that third parties adequately compensate
authors for any unreasonable prejudice suffered as a consequence of the unauthorized use of
their productions.").
246. UDHR, supra note 232, art. 17 ("Everyone has the right to own property alone as
well as in association with others.... [and] [nlo one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his prop-
erty.").
247. Organization of American States, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man, art. 23, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States (1948), re-
printed in SECRETARIAT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN CT. OF HUM. RTs., BASIC DOCUMENTS
PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, OAS Doc.
OAS/Ser.L/V1I.4 rev. 13 (June 30, 2010) ("Every person has a right to own such private prop-
erty as meets the essential needs of decent living and helps to maintain the dignity of the
individual and of the home.").
504 [Vol. 32:461
Considering these rights, one can see the evolution of a balancing
test similar to one that exists in other areas of law, such as the U.S. con-
ception of copyright fair use.248 First, there is an internal human rights
balancing test. One assesses the current state of access to the technology
and asks, does pricing play a role in reducing access such that a core
health obligation is impacted? One also considers what impact the remu-
neration discount would have on the right to benefit from the invention.
Second, there should be an external innovation incentive policy balanc-
ing. What impact would a royalty reduction have on the overall
innovation environment? In some cases, where there is great need for
access supported by human rights principles, and little impact on in-
vestment returns, the reduction in remuneration from market levels may
be great.249 In others, where access is not a problem and profit would be
dramatically affected, remuneration reduction will be small. This con-
struction essentially formalizes what advocates on all sides have been
saying for years.
Clearly, using a broad system like this would not yield complete
predictability, but it would compel actors to articulate a case for their
plan and have some understanding of when rules will bend in their favor.
For example, one could outline the three scenarios above and see how a
human rights perspective provides significantly more guidance.
TABLE 1 EXAMPLES OF HUMAN RIGHTS BALANCING
IN REMUNERATION CALCULATION
impact on Health and Impact on Right to Impact on
Unauthorized Use U Rights Benefit from P lnovation Outcome
sSmall i cts due Small impacts on Compulsory licensing at aCurrenf AIDS, TB, and Limited increase in access Salipcsdeinnovation for steep discount from
malaria treatments genenics developed countries developing country developing country
diseases market not necessary
Large impact due fo Little impact due fo Compulsory licensing at aAgrochemical licensing by Limited increase due to Larsteep discount frommiddle-developed countries competitive market market developing countryc pncing 
market not necessary
Significant increase in Very little impact Compulsory licensing at a
Emergency reaction to access due to volume Small impact due to due to ex ante steep discount from
pandemic purchasing and limited expected profits in ntr f dvlpn onr
production by intellectual developed countries emergency market may be necessary
property owner e m
An understanding of which interests the law favors, in turn, fosters
negotiation whenever possible. That is essentially the lesson of copyright
248. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (listing several factors to be considered in determining
if a particular use of a copyrighted work is fair).
249. See Alan Devlin et al., Success, Dominance and Interoperability, 84 IND. L.J. 1157,
1188-89 (2009) (noting that intellectual rights that are not economically important or "weak"
in a particular market are excellent candidates for compulsory licensing).
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compulsory licensing (and arguably Paragraph 6 licensing). 25 0 If yOU cre-
ate enough certainty in the commercial and regulatory landscape, a
private market will fill in the spaces unless impeded by some other bar-
rier. In such a case, compulsory licensing can be used to address the
deficiency.
Key to a human rights remuneration attenuation system is the par-
ticipation of an international decision making body, namely the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body.5 While this entity has been growing more
active in recent years, deciding a number of issues related to TRIPS, 252 it
has never commented on remuneration. It is reasonable to assume that
additional expertise would be necessary. But such expertise is not unat-
tainable, or even unusual in the field of intellectual property
compensation. In every infringement case, courts and lay juries are re-
quired to make an ex post determination of damages in view of a number
of complex factors.253 There is no reason to assume that a WTO body
would be unable to do the same, and perhaps issue some measure of
guidance in the form of advisory opinions. In addition, it is likely that a
political process could be included to ensure that royalty rules capture all
of the relevant interests, as in the case of U.S. copyright royalty set-
ting.254 Though one could argue that such a process is already guaranteed
by the WTO's own negotiation structure, the long and contentious debate
leading up to the Paragraph 6 implementation suggests that there may be
better alternatives.
Of course, functionally, a remuneration attenuation system must also
be implemented in national laws. The WTO Dispute Settlement Body's
power extends only to sanctions for countries that do not fulfill their ob-
ligations under TRIPS and other aspects of the GATT. To comply, a
country would be required to establish a process for ensuring the rele-
vant human rights and innovation considerations are taken into account
in setting royalties. Theoretically, any country that has a process for ex-
propriating property already has the outline in place, and certain
specifics relevant to patents would simply need to be incorporated.
250. See Crane, supra note 218, at 295-96.
251. See Taubman, supra note 173, at 951-52; see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Fos-
tering Dynamic Innovation, Development, and Trade: Intellectual Property as a Case Study in
Global Administrative Law, 2009 ACTA JURIDICA 237 (2009).
252. Disputes by Agreement: Intellectual Property (TRIPS), supra note 224; Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS and Essential Medicines: Must One Size Fit All? Making the WTO
Responsive to the Global Health Crisis 52 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law and Legal The-
ory Res. Series, Working Paper No. 09-44, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=
1443248.
253. See David W. Opderbeck, Patent Damages Reform and the Shape of Patent Law, 89
B.U. L. REV. 127, 132-34 (2009) (describing the current process for determining lost profits
and a reasonable royalty under U.S. patent law).
254. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
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What about countries such as the United States that do not adhere
to ICESCR 255-Would a remuneration attenuation regime based on such
principles be subject to serious objection? This would likely be the
case if the regime were imposed on a given country, but such imple-
mentation is actually never required. The ability to attenuate
remuneration is a voluntary relaxation of intellectual property obliga-
tions, and as with other flexible provisions in TRIPS, countries may
impose stronger property standards. This is of course exactly what has
occurred today with the Paragraph 6 implementation. Although many
countries have revised their laws in response, other countries-the Unit-
ed States, for example-have not.
C. Future Revision: Streamlining the Rules with Open Licensing
While the above remuneration policy could be instituted with only
slight revision to TRIPS, it is possible to imagine more significant
changes that would increase the utility of a compulsory license regime.
While more substantial changes would present a greater challenge politi-
cally, the benefits would be significant. Specifically, consider that when
a remuneration attenuation process is coupled with a complex set of cri-
teria limiting when countries are even eligible to consider a license, the
utility of the system is greatly reduced. The imposition of subject matter
limitations, time limitations, or pre-negotiation requirements 25 6 has the
effect of squeezing the utility of licensing for no real benefit to property
owners. All such limitations can be eliminated under a human rights-
based remuneration system without a negative impact on innovation in-
centives.
A more controversial but equally important streamlining measure
would be to eliminate the general requirement that compulsory licensing
be primarily for use in the licensing country.257 From the perspective of
255. See supra note 228.
256. The TRIPS agreement contains several procedural restrictions that limit the breadth
of a compulsory license. Some are generally applicable to all compulsory licenses, such as the
requirement that authorization be individual and limited in scope and duration, as opposed to a
standing license. TRIPS, supra note 29, art. 31(a), (c). Other limitations are specific to the
license type, such as the requirement for prior negotiation with the patent holder except in
cases of emergency, urgency, or public non-commercial use, TRIPS, supra note 29, art. 3 1(b),
or the need to confirm a lack of manufacturing capacity in the Paragraph 6 amendments, Para-
graph 6 Decision, supra note 33, 1 2(a)(ii). In addition, national legislation often imposes
additional constraints, such as Canada's requirement for Health Canada approval before ex-
porting medicines. Canada's Access to Medicines Regime: Preparing to Submit an
Application, Gov'T OF CAN., http://www.camr-rcam.gc.ca/compan-entrepris/applic-demande/
prepar-e.html (last updated July 28, 2006). Moreover, regional trade agreements (particularly
those known as 'TRIPS-plus"), see Bird, supra note 8, at 211, or bilateral investment treaties,
see generally Gibson, supra note 81, may add additional procedural limitations.
257. TRIPS, supra note 29, art. 31(f).
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the property owner, if compensation is fairly attenuated as outlined
above, such a license could actually result in more efficient pricing. As
long as royalties are connected to specific sales, there should be no need
(nor advantage) to requiring specific licenses. In many ways, a stream-
lined process mimics the freedom of copyright fair use in the United
States. Rather than define the eligibility for fair use or create an ex ante
application process, people engage in good faith and prepare to argue for
the benefits if infringement occurs.
However, for an open licensing regime to function, one limitation
vaguely supported in TRIPS must be enhanced: national exhaustion."
National patent exhaustion is the principle that a sale in one country ex-
hausts the patentee's right in only that country.25 It is an essential
component of limiting parallel importation between countries that in turn
* * 260preserves tiered pricing.
Of course, national exhaustion seems overly strict when it precludes
parallel importation between countries at a similar development stage. It
may be largely impractical as well. This is the idea behind the Paragraph
6 implementation rule permitting trade of licensed pharmaceuticals be-
tween least-developed countries. 26' This principle could be extended to
provide for economic regional exhaustion.262
In general, a streamlined, open licensing model would do much to
enhance the efficiencies of remuneration attenuation without burdening
property owners. However, this would constitute a fairly radical change
to TRIPS, and it is difficult to imagine much progress soon. In contrast,
much of the human rights framework articulated above could be insti-
tuted without a great deal of effort or negotiation. Therefore,
remuneration attenuation provides a better starting point for developing a
more rational, equitable, and functional patent breaking system.
258. The TRIPS agreement specifically does not address the issue of intellectual prop-
erty exhaustion. TRIPS, supra note 29, art. 6.
259. Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(articulating the doctrine in the context of an infringement case concerning disposable cam-
eras); see also Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (clarifying
the doctrine in the context of licensees).
260. See Cahoy, supra note 8, at 187-92 (describing the significance of exhaustion in the
context of medicines); Yadav, supra note 139, at 39-40 (stating that the lack of market seg-
mentation is a barrier to tiered pricing).
261. Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 33, 1 6(i).
262. The European Union provides for regional exhaustion based on membership. Rob-
ert C. Bird & Peggy E. Chaudhry, Pharmaceuticals and the European Union: Managing Gray
Markets in an Uncertain Legal Environment, 50 VA. J. INT'L L. 719, 732-33 (2010). Because
this is not based on economic need, but rather trade policy, it would be better to provide for an
economic-based regional exhaustion. For example, one could exhaust rights between all least-
developed countries..
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CONCLUSION
The current dysfunction in compulsory licensing under the TRIPS re-
gime yields a system with all of the disadvantages of reduced intellectual
property rights protection, but none of the access advantages imagined.
Populations truly in need lose, while the politically powerful gain unnec-
essary advantages. A consideration of the full scope of compulsory
license use highlights these issues and also suggests a route for reform.
Reform based on incorporating balancing human rights norms into the
remuneration mechanism is a simple fix that is likely to make compul-
sory licensing useful and predictable in the future.
